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ABSTRACT
This thesis analyzes several aspects of the difficulties in litigating concerns of environmental injustice
in order to purpose an alternative approach that still allows groups to enter the public policy forum
of the court system while avoiding the confines of acting as a party in litigation. Discovering the
shortcomings in environmental laws and regulations to address the substantive issues of
environmental justice, and finding the discriminatory intent requirement of the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution difficult to prove, and encouragement in
the use of amicus briefs, this thesis describes the potential advantages to participating as amici by
environmental justice activists.
An analysis of four exclusionary zoning cases and accompanying amicus curiae briefs was considered
to illustrate the information that these briefs can contain that differs from the views presented by the
formal litigants in these cases. The use of these briefs was found to offer a mechanism to express
broad societal issues, various perspectives, and technical information to assist the court in
understanding diverse public interests.
This study concludes that amicus briefs may by particularly useful in the environmental justice
movement because the issues of environmental injustice are often difficult to translate into legal
challenges. The writing of amicus briefs by community members can maintain a local commentary,
capturing the voices and stories of a community that reflect a specific perspective that is not easily
understood by outsiders. Through these briefs, environmental justice activists can explain issues that
may either be touched upon or not included in the party briefs, describe the impact of a ruling on an
effort to realize the goals of environmental justice, and potentially influence the court's holding in a
case. Therefore, the use of amicus briefs by environmental justice activists, coupled with community
organizing strategies, may be better suited for educating the judiciary about these concerns, than a
narrow legal claim.
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Chapter One: Introducing the Idea
My basic sense of it has always been to get people to understand that in the long run they
themselves are the only protection they have... people have to be made to understand that
they cannot look for salvation anywhere but in themselves.
- Ella Baker, talking about the civil rights movement
Several years ago I was introduced to an unfamiliar aspect of urban life through my job as a
cartographer. My assignment at the time involved data gathering and mapping of fifteen categories
of government-reported toxic sites in the New York metropolitan area. I traveled to one
neighborhood in Brooklyn, New York, and looking out the window from my seat on the elevated
train, I saw industrial and hazardous land uses serving as surrogates for backyards and parks.
Stepping on to the platform I was truly amazed at the dichotomy of beautiful homes next to vacant
lots, boarded up facades, garbage dumps, and parcels filled with construction debris surrounded by
sagging chain link fences.
We traveled via Greyhound from Ithaca to this neighborhood to discuss their urban
environmental problems in light of a new bond act passed in New York State that could be used to
redevelop the vacant industrial sites that abutted the old brownstones. The group was hesitant to put
too much faith or resources into developing a plan for state funding. Their hesitation came from a
history of unsuccessful efforts to bring attention to the community's concerns of living next to so
many hazardous facilities. The mood changed when I started to walk through the findings of our
environmental report that mapped and classified the "known" and "potential" hazards sited in their
area.
The maps and the data showed that their neighborhood was surrounded by both classes of
hazardous facilities, something that was not news to them. But what it also showed was the prior
industrial uses of the now vacant lots that had never been cleaned up, the past uses of land that were
not remediated before (re)development, and the large number of ancient underground storage tanks
for oil that had never been pulled. All of this information came from data required under federal and
state laws for permitting, monitoring and compliance measures. Data provided for the underground
storage tanks was required because older tanks were seen as an environmental risk due to the
likelihood that the tanks were now leaking.
There was genuine sentiment that this neighborhood, like many others they had lived in or
seen throughout the city, was passed over. It was unclear why environmental laws, written to
promote the public health and welfare, didn't work in this area, with a concentration of so many
different potentially hazardous land uses. Was this a result of local zoning ordinances that had
initially mapped the area as residential, and had since been amended to provide for a "mixed-use"
zone, enabling industry to locate next to residences?
What really matters here are the remarks of the community members on more fundamental issues of
justice, fairness, and equality that somehow did not apply to their neighborhood. In this case people
did not want to vote with their feet. They wanted a neighborhood that was cleaner and safer; they
wanted the vacant lots turned into something useful instead of illegal garbage dumps; they wanted a
voice in land use decisions that impacted their daily lives; and they wanted to know about
environmental hazards from their representatives, not from groups hired to tell them the story. All
told, the community organizers in Gowanus Canal wanted what other similar groups throughout the
country were calling for, environmental justice.
The Study
Local land use controls written into zoning ordinances are sometimes a remedy for some of
the problems existing in urban areas that environmental laws are not designed to address.
Conversely, these land use controls can actually exacerbate feelings of injustice and inequity in several
different ways. First, zoning ordinances can divide urban areas in such a way that unequally burdens
some residents by incompatible, but contiguous uses. Second, once these zones are established for
industrial and/or hazardous uses, new facilities are more likely to be sited in these areas without
significant permitting hassles because they now fit into the existing land use patterns of the area.
Finally, specific land use controls that deprive mostly poor, minority communities of essential equal
protection from harmful land uses, or are written in a way that hinders the integration of peoples into
these areas based on economic class and race, are exclusionary, and environmental injustices.
This study begins by examining the latter example. The relationship between environmental
justice issues and exclusionary zoning is based on my working definition, which is:
Issues arising from discriminatory decisions in land use policy in the form of zoning ordinances
that separate people, places, and work in an exclusionary manner and that adversely affect the
quality of life of urban residents.
This relationship is developed in order to understand the similar roots of these issues, and the
subsequent difficulties, based on the underlying factors that shape these issues, that community
groups face when they attempt to challenge perceived discriminatory policies as legal issues. There
are many reasons why environmental justice and exclusionary zoning claims have been difficult to
redress in the court system, but the fundamental concerns of justice and fairness expressed as part of
the environmental justice movement requires further attempts at gaining acceptance in the courts.
The third chapter of this thesis explains an approach to litigation that may expand a
pertinent case beyond the claims of the litigants to include issues of environmental justice.
This approach is the amicus curiae brief, a legal tool that offers a flexible format for expressing
environmental justice interests in a case without the confines of legalese or the restrictions of
pursuing a narrow legal claim. To better understand the potential benefits to environmental justice
activists of participating as amici in pertinent litigation, the fourth chapter examines four exclusionary
zoning cases and their respective amicus briefs. Some of the exportable lessons learned from these
examples are applied in an outline of the information that could be included in a brief to support the
plaintiffs in the environmental justice case analyzed in the last chapter.
The evidence in this study is provided in an attempt to support several claims that will be
developed throughout the paper. First, the restrictions of making a specific legal claim under existing
laws in order to gain standing in court, and the "absence of clear and challenging legal issues"
(Babcock 1996, 106) in environmental justice concerns are impediments to redressing these issues in
the court system. More specifically, the discriminatory intent requirement of the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment makes pursuing claims of environmental injustice under this
law difficult. Proving that policies or actions, or their results, intentional discriminated against an
individual or group based on their economic class or race is a high barrier to cross. Therefore,
participating as amici, coupled with community organizing strategies, supports a different kind of
entrance into the policy-making world of the court system. These briefs can explain the broad
societal issues that may either be touched upon or not included in the party's briefs, which can
educate the court about environmental justice concerns, and potentially influence the court's holding,
without the restrictions mentioned above.
Second, amicus briefs may be particularly useful in the environmental justice movement
because the issues are so deeply embedded in a history of segregation and unequal opportunity that it
is often difficult to translate these concerns into legal challenges that maintain the real roots of
grassroots struggles. The writing of amicus briefs by community groups can maintain a local
commentary, capturing the voices and stories of a community that reflect a specific perspective that
is not easily understood by outsiders. Because these outsiders are often the people in decision-making
roles that can influence policy reform, their understanding of environmental justice issues is essential
to creating more equitable outcomes that "society as a whole will follow and respect." (Epstein and
Knight 1999, 232)
Third, because the origins of environmental justice are not legal issues, but rather economic
and political matters, many environmental justice activists consider litigation an inappropriate means
of addressing these concerns. This thesis does not contest this argument, but rather suggests the use
of amicus briefs as an alternative to litigation in some cases based on the idea that pursuing a struggle
in court is sometimes required as a last resort. These briefs, if well crafted, offer community
groups with limited resources and complex concerns an opportunity to affect a decision without the
risks of an unsuccessful outcome or the costs of litigating. Therefore, the use of amicus briefs by
environmental justice activists may be better suited for educating the judiciary about environmental
justice, than a narrow legal claim.
Chapter Two: Impediments toJustice: The Difficulties in Litigating Claims of
Environmental Injustice
While few people would dispute that the inequities of society seem to be especially evident in urban
areas, and scholars suggest that "Americans overwhelming deplore both racial discrimination and
environmental degradation (Foreman p.1)," the convergence of cultural, racial, economic and
environmental issues as mutually reinforcing is a contemporary one. The concept of social justice
and the claim that the current environmental protection/regulatory framework works to divide
society on economic class, race, and power lines has emerged as a "prominent part of the national
dialogue over citizen empowerment and the environment" (Capek p. 5) in the name of
environmental justice.
The Concept of Environmental Justice
Grassroot organizations consisting mainly of low-income, people of color, are challenging
perceived inequities and discrimination resulting from environmental laws and land use patterns as
environmental racism.' The concepts of environmental justice2 and environmental equity3 are in part
based on the national response by local community groups to remedy the situations that have led to
environmental racism. "Environmental justice is premised on the notion that the rights of toxic
contamination victims have been systematically usurped by more powerful social actors and that
'justice' resides in the return of these rights (Capek p. 8)." Environmental justice activists... [see]
"environmental problems as only part of the larger social issues of racism and cultural and economic
injustice (Gauna p. 1,9)."
1 Bunyan Bryant defines environmental racism as "an extension of racism. It refers to those institutional rules,
regulations, and policies of government or corporate decisions, that deliberately target certain communities for
least desirable land uses, resulting in the disproportionate exposure of toxic and hazardous waste on
communities based on certain prescribed biological characteristics. Environmental racism is the unequal
protection against toxic and hazardous waste exposure and the systematic exclusion of people of color from
environmental decisions affecting their communities.
2 Environmental justice-EJ is broader in scope than environmental equity. It refers to those cultural norms and
values, rules, regulations, behaviors, policies, and decisions to support sustainable communities, where people
can interact with confidence that their environment is safe, nurturing, and productive. Environmental justice is
served when people can realize their highest potential, without experiencing the "isms". Environmental justice
is supported by decent paying and safe jobs; quality school and recreation; decent housing and adequate health
care; democratic decision-making and personal empowerment; and communities free of violence, drugs, and
poverty. These are communities where both cultural and biological diversity are respected and highly revered
and where distributed justice prevails.
3Environmental equity- refers to the equal protection of environmental laws. For example, under the
Superfund clean-up program it has been shown that abandoned hazardous waste sites in minority areas take 20
percent longer to be placed on the national priority action list that those in white areas. Therefore laws should
be enforced equally to ensure the proper siting, clean up of hazardous wastes, and effective regulation of
industrial pollution, regardless of the racial and economic composition of the community.
As William Shutkin 4 points out, "environmental justice entails much more than a clarion call
to action on the part of low-income and minority communities facing environmental and public
health hazards. It is ultimately about the promise of American democracy and the possibility of
redeeming the environment as a preeminent symbol of our democracy's highest aspirations (Shutkin
p.580)." Drawing on his own beliefs and the writings of others, Shutkin later adds, "conversely, the
persistence of environmental injustice-the exclusion and unequal treatment of low-income and
minority communities in matters concerning the distribution of environmental benefits and burdens-
fundamentally undermines our democratic faith and commitments (Shutkin p.580)."
In order to better understand environmental justice as both a set of guiding principles to
challenge questions of environmental racism and environmental equity and as a social justice
movement to pursue answers to these questions, the concept of the specific "frame" within which
community groups have mobilized requires some description.
Section 1: Environmental Justice and Environmental Law
The Framework of the Environmental Justice Movement
The concept of an "environmental justice" frame is important in understanding and
interpreting the potential impediments community groups face in mobilizing for social change.
Because the goal of this paper is to purpose a rationale for the use of amicus curiae briefs in
environmental justice litigation, and not to discuss the theories of resource mobilization and social
construction, the ideas of this section are drawn largely from the academic literature on
environmental justice, most notably the work of Stella Capek5.
Capek's arguments are grounded in the sociological literature, which contains the writings of
many environmental justice academics/activists, to develop the range of barriers that grassroots
organizations face in their struggle for self-determination. The numerous studies6 supporting the
concept that race, and therefore often economic class, play a role in the process of siting hazardous
4 Past co-director, Alternatives for Community and Environment, Roxbury, MA.
s Department of Sociology, Hendrix College
6 United States General Accounting Office, Siting of H azardous Waste Landfills and Their Correlation with Racial and
Economic Status of Surrounding Communities (GAO/RCED-83-168) June 1, 1983:United Church of Christ,
Commission for Racial Justice, Toxic Wastes and Race in the United States A National Report on the Racial and Socio-
Economic Characteristics of Communities with Hazardous Waste Sites(New York: United Church of Christ, 1987);
Robert D. Bullard, Dumping in Dixie: Race, Class, and EnvironmentalQuality (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press,
1990); Lavelle, M. and M.Coyle, "Unequal Protection: The Racial Divide in Environmental Law." The National
Law Journal 15(3) Sept. 21. 1992. United Church of Christ, Commission for Racial Justice, Center for Policy
Alternatives and the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) Toxic Wastes and
Race Revisited, (1994).
facilities, are understood as part of the development of an "environmental justice" frame. Capek
writes:
Defining a situation as unjust is more than an act of categorization; it implies a strategy for
action. Residents in contaminated communities are generally pushed by their experiences
toward a particular set of mobilizing strategies. A typical (although not inevitable) path is to
opt for direct action tactics upheld by an "environmental justice" frame. This choice implies
rejection of other possible frames. For example, it has been amply documented that many
activists begin with assumptions of fairness about the political and regulatory process in the
United States, as well as a naive faith in science as unbiased and "above politics (Gibbs 1982;
Levine 1982). As a result of their experiences, this frame's validity is shattered (p.8)
The concept of an "environmental justice" frame in the context of Capek's study of an African-
American community in Texarkana, Texas, consists of four claims that are supported by the literature
on environmental justice. Capek begins by stating that the environmental justice frame is built around
a concept of rights constructed in part by the actions and rhetoric of previous social movements.
Most notable among these the civil rights movement (Capek p.8).
The five claims that create the environmental justice frame relate to environmental issues,
but also suggest the general claims of this movement on other issues. These claims include the right
to: (1) accurate information about the situation; (2) a prompt, respectful, and unbiased hearing when
contamination claims are made; (3) democratic participation in deciding the future of the
contaminated community; and (4) compensation from parties who have inflicted injuries on the
victim (Capek, p.9). Capek maintains, using case study evidence, that the residents' ability to
mobilize for social change was intimately linked to their adoption of an "environmental justice"
frame (Capek, p.5).
This evidence is mirrored in the early struggles for environmental justice that took place in
Houston, Texas in 1967; Love Canal, NY in 1978; and Warren County, North Carolina in 1982,
where citizens recognized environmental problems as injustice, sought answers to these problems,
and in the later examples, organized around the concerns in direct action stances. (See Appendix B
for a chronology of grassroots efforts and governmental responses and studies in terms of
environmental justice).
The local claims of environmental justice took shape as a social movement when
communities began to share their stories through grassroots networks that eventually led to a
national meeting in Washington, D.C., that helped define the principles of environmental justice and
determine a plan of action for this movement.
The Principles of Environmental Justice
Perhaps the most important or symbolic piece of the environmental justice chronology
occurred in October 1991, in Washington, D.C. Activists from across the United States came
together for the First National People of Color Environmental Leadership Summit. The term
"environmental justice" was used for the first time as a means to express the broad beliefs and
concerns expressed by the diverse participants. The development of the creed of the environmental
justice movement is illustrated in the preamble to the "Principles of Environmental Justice", the
document completed by participants at the Summit. The melding of individual stories with social,
cultural, and environmental issues created the basic guidelines and "structure" for grassroots
organizations to translate into local level activism. The preamble reads as follows:
We the people of color, gathered together at this multi-national People of Color Environmental
Leadership Summit, to begin to build a national and international movement of all peoples of
color to fight the destruction and taking of our lands and communities; do hereby re-establish
our spiritual interdependence to the sacredness of our Mother Earth; to respect and celebrate
each of our cultures, languages, and beliefs about the natural world and our role in healing
ourselves; to insure environmental justice; to promote economic alternatives which would
contribute to the development of environmentally safe livelihoods; and, to secure our political,
economic, and cultural liberation that has been denied for over 500 years of colonization and
oppression, resulting in the poisoning of our communities and land and the genocide of our
peoples, do affirm and adopt the Principles of Environmental Justice.7
The "seventeen Principles of Environmental Justice' affirmed everyone's right to safe and healthy
working environments, quality health care, and freedom from the need to chose between unsafe jobs and
unemployment" (Foreman, p. 12). (The full text of the principles can be found in Appendix A). The
perceived inequities in environmental protection laws and regulations that prompted civil rights activist
Benjamin Chavis to coin the phrase "environmental racism," remain at the forefront of urban grassroots
struggles to reclaim their neighborhoods.
A pervasive claim of the environmental justice movement has been the incapacity of
environmental laws to protect all citizens equally. In this analysis to determine the difficulties and
impediments in litigating environmental justice claims, we can look to the language and ideas behind
environmental laws as the first of several barriers to redressing these claims.
7 Proceedings: The First National People of Color Environmental Leadership Summit (October 24-27, 1991)
Agenda setting, Movements, and Environmental Laws
The environmental justice literature suggests that environmental and land use laws have
provided more environmental benefits to the white and the affluent while providing fewer
benefits to or worsening the conditions of the poor and communities of color. In that
sense, environmental laws are seen as a "cause" of environmental injustice. The skewing of
benefits and burdens occurs in the variety of ways, ranging from the policy-making process
to the differing abilities of different groups to take advantage of the protections
environmental laws intend to offer.
- Alice Kaswan 1997
Some environmental justice activists, most notably Robert Bullard, maintain that current
environmental policies that "exist to manage, regulate, and distribute risks," and provide equal
protection through environmental statutes, have failed. He writes, "the dominant environmental
protection paradigm reinforces, rather than challenges, the stratification of people (race, ethnicity,
status, power, etc.), place (central cities, suburbs, rural areas, etc.), and work (Bullard 1994, p.16).
In his view, the dominant environmental protection paradigm: (1) institutionalizes unequal
enforcement; (2) trades human health for profit; (3) places the burden of proof on the "victims," not
on polluting industry; (4) legitimates human exposure to harmful chemicals, pesticides, and
hazardous substances; (5) promotes "risky" technologies such as incinerators; (6) exploits the
vulnerability of economically and politically disenfranchised communities; (7) delays cleanup actions;
and (8) fails to develop pollution prevention as the overarching and dominant strategy (Bullard 1994,
16).
The ideas expressed by Bullard can be linked to two different facts. First is the notion that
extensive studies on the facility siting process (footnoted in the "environmental justice" frame
section), and the role of this process in exacerbating issues of fairness and justice in inner-cities,
reflects an "underlying political reality: it is often politically "easier" for government authorities to put
toxic dumps in poorer communities (Tsao, p.36 7)." And second the fact that most national
environmental organizations in the 1960s and early 1970s focused on preservation issues surrounding
species (some endangered) and their habitats, and the National Park System. These agendas did not
talk about the distribution of environmental "problems" such as pollution from hazardous facilities.
This is important to consider because the agenda of these organizations played a large role in shaping
congressional opinion at the time, which is reflected in the majority of the federal environmental
statutes written during this period.
"In the 1970s almost all existing federal laws were promulgated. A key feature of these laws
was that they focused primarily on reducing aggregate pollution levels, rather than on the
distribution (Kaswan p.260)." Adding to this idea, Professor Gauna writes, "major environmental
laws lack legislative provisions specifically addressing distributional inequity to low income and
minority communities, which suggest that the problem was not anticipated, or that there was
insufficient political pressure brought to bear upon the issue (Gauna p.3)." The lack of political
pressure to consider the convergence of environmental and socioeconomic issues, and the fact that
this convergence was not anticipated, goes back to the idea that the environmental movement and
civil rights movement had very different agendas at the time. Because the civil rights movement did
not focus significant attention on urban environmental issues, which could have developed some
political pressure, these issues have only recently received attention from government agencies.
Christopher Foreman captures the importance of these ideas in the current struggles for
environmental justice. He writes:
The bedrock federal statutes of modem environmentalism were enacted between 1969 and
1980; environmental justice activists held their first meetings with EPA administrator
William Reilly only in 1990-a full decade after Congress passed the last of these laws. By the
time of those meetings the EPA itself was nearly twenty years old and well institutionalized.
Basic structures and procedures were already in place. Part-but only part-of the frustration
of environmental justice advocates is attributable to this late start (Foreman p. 7).
This discourse system, the agenda of national environmental organizations, and the general absence
of people of color in these organizations promoted the sentiment, especially among people of color,
that environmentalism was a middle-class, white movement. (See e.g., Bullard 1994; Gottlieb 1993;
Reich 1992) Some environmental justice activists have therefore argued that the agenda and hiring
policies administered by the environmental movement were racist (Boyle 1993; Bryant 1989).
Based on the reality that environmentalism (in terms of these national organizations) did not
acknowledge urban issues, and that environmental concerns for low-income, people of color
communities were largely situated in their urban surroundings, most activists and/or scholars
contend that the ideological gaps which appeared to divide environmental issues on racial lines, was
more a result of rhetoric that was not totally opposite, but was totally different. (Boyle 1993;
Commoner 1971; Mohai 1985, 1990; Poirier, 1994; Taylor 1989; Torres 1992). Adding to this idea,
Hope Babcock writes,
Federal pollution control laws are national in scope and thus do not address the highly
localized problems found in inner cities and their economically disadvantaged communities.
Environmental laws typically set broad-based, uniform standards that do not account for
cumulative impacts or the synergistic behavior of pollutants in the urban environment.
Hence, the urban paradigm-chronic, low level, environmental degradation from numerous
sources, including polluted runoff from city streets, air pollution from crowded city streets
or freeways, lead poisoning from poor housing stock or old plumbing, and leaking
underground fuel storage tanks-is not adequately addressed by federal environmental
laws (Babcock p.15, 16).
While environmental justice advocates may challenge the process of permitting hazardous facilities
under existing federal and state statutes and file citizen suit provisions to redress the situations that
have caused "environmental racism," the question of justice often still remains. Attorney James H.
Colopy writes, "in the environmental justice context, litigants have attempted to use the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to challenge the siting of a facility in a community
of color on the grounds that the government decision-maker was racially discriminatory in selecting
the site. To date, however, none of these claims have succeeded (Colopy p. 145)."
The Link Between Environmental Justice and Zoning
Community groups litigating environmental justice concerns have also pursued claims under
Civil Rights8 and Constitutional Law, in an attempt to redress the real questions of justice as a civil
right. The use of the Fourteenth Amendment in environmental justice litigation provides the link
between the claims of distributional injustice related to environmental pollutants, and the societal
issues of environmental justice developed in exclusionary zoning cases.
"Like exclusionary zoning, the inequitable distribution of toxic waste dumps is patently
unfair. In both cases, a community's attempt to bar what they perceive to be an undesirable land use
through zoning restrictions imposes large costs on the poor and racial minorities. The analogy
between the unfairness inherent in excluding low- and moderate-income housing from certain areas
based on zoning and the inequitable distribution of toxic waste dumps is important in states where
siting statutes do not completely preempt municipal and regional zoning laws (Tsao p. 403)."
"So far, almost every environmental justice civil rights case brought has alleged only a
violation of the equal protection clause of the Constitution. And so far, no plaintiff has prevailed in
such a claim in an environmental justice suit, although this strategy has been tried in numerous
jurisdictions around the country9 (Cole 1994, 538)." On this point, Adam Schwartz 0 writes, "in
8 Civil Rights Laws, particularly Title VI (42 U.S.C. § 2000d 1988) and Title VIII (42 U.S.C. §5 3601-3619, 3631
1988) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Title VI prohibits discrimination on the grounds of race, color, and
national origin by "any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance." Title VIII bars the refusal
"to sell or rent... or otherwise make unavailable, or deny, a dwelling to any person because of race, color,
religion, sex, familial status or national origin, and bars discrimination against any person in the... sale or rental
of a dwelling, or in the provision of services or facilities in connection therewith, because of race, color,
religion, sex, familial status or national origin."
9 Harrisburg Coalition Against Ruining the Env't v. Volpe., 330 F. Supp. 918 (M.D. Pa. 1971); Bean v.
Southwestern Waste Management Corp., 482 F. Supp. 673 (S.D. Tex. 1979), affd without opinion, 782 F.2d.
1038 ( 5th Cir. 1986); NAACP v. Gorsuch, No. 82-768-CIV-5, slip op. (E.D.N.C. Aug. 10, 1982); East Bibb
Twiggs Neighborhood Ass'n v. Macon-Bibbs County Planning & Zoning Comm'n, 706 F. Supp. 880 (M.D.
Ga. 1989) aff'd, 896 F. 2d 1264 (lth Cir. 1989);Bordeaux Action Comm'n v. Metro. Nashville, No. 390-0214
(M.D. Tenn. Filed March 12, 1990) El Pueblo Para el Aire y Agua Limpio v. Chemical Waste Management,
Inc., No. CIV-F-91-578-OWW (E.D. Cal. Filed July 7, 1991) RI.S.E. Inc. v. Kay, 768 F. Supp. 1144, 22 ELR
20200 (E.D. Va. 1991) aff'd, 977 F 2d. 573 (4 th Cir. 1992).
several lawsuits challenging hazardous waste facility sitings that disproportionately affect minority
populations, federal courts have ruled against the plaintiffs because they failed to prove
discriminatory intent (Schwartz p. 2)." This standard was established in one of the exclusionary
zoning case discussed in chapters two and three. In Village ofArlington Heights v. Metropolitan Dev.
Housing Corp.n, the U.S. Supreme Court declared that a race-neutral law with a disparate impact can
violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution only if
there is proof of discriminatory intent. The Arlington Heights doctrine has single-handedly blocked
at least five federal cases alleging environmental racism (see footnote #16) (Schwartz p.17).
Section II: Zoning: Land Use Restrictions and Barriers
Zoning and Environmental Justice
The desire to look at environmental justice challenges through the lens of exclusionary
zoning evolved from the idea that the environmental justice movement is relatively new and broad in
scope. Because the idea behind this chapter is to understand why environmental justice challenges
under existing laws have failed in the courts, and how these concerns can still be communicated
before the court, it was necessary to focus on one aspect of environmental justice with a legal history.
Zoning and land use controls seemed an appropriate route. In accordance with this idea, law
professor Dennis Binder begins his index of environmental justice cases, writing;
If environmental justice is viewed just in terms of locally undesirable land uses (LULUs)
being thrust upon a politically impotent neighborhood, the resulting literature may seem
disproportionate to the case law. Yet, the reality it that environmental discrimination is a
problem of great social significance, well-deserving of extensive discussion. We need to
recognize that the placing of LULUs in poor neighborhoods is but part of the post-World
War II move to the suburbs, which partially reflects an effort to isolate affluent areas from
the hard or undesirable realities of life (Binder p. 163).
As most people who write about land use and zoning in some capacity begin, the concept of zoning
was always meant to prohibit or exclude certain land uses from mixing with other uses to promote
the health, safety and general welfare of an area. A zoning ordinance can be viewed as
discriminatory, or exclusionary, if it results in restricting land uses in a way that results in selecting
what "kinds" of people can live in a certain place. A zoning ordinance can also be discriminatory if
incompatible uses unequally burden the people living in one section of that place.
10 At the time his article was published, 1995, Adam Schwartz was serving as a judicial clerk to the Honorable
Betty Fletcher, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
11 429 U.S .252 (1977)
As Richard Babcock notes, "it is frequently charged and often apparent, that local zoning
practices on the fringes of metropolitan areas are designed to keep out the distasteful aspects of
urbanization while permitting access to its fruits. These practices create exclusionary conditions
directly in conflict with the goals of social mobility and economic opportunity (Babcock 1996, 107)."
In considering the idea of exclusionary zoning and environmental racism, Professor Jon
Dubin argues, "the persistence of stark patterns of residential segregation in the 1990s serves as a
reminder of this country's legacy of systematic discrimination in land use policy. At the same time,
new and insidious forms of land use assaults-ranging from the disparate impact of toxic waste
facilities to the stimulation of foreseeable race-based gentrification-pose unprecedented risks to the
survival and integrity of low-income communities of color (Dubin p.801)."
Exclusionary zoning is an aspect of environmental justice that dates back to the first
challenge to the police power of an area to restrict how people could live and work, in the case of
Yick Wo. v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886), sometimes considered the original environmental racism
case. From 1886 to the present there have been countless challenges in the federal and state courts
regarding land uses deemed incompatible, nuisances or public health concerns, and the resulting
effects on individuals and groups.
Zoning as a Constitutional Extension of Local Police Power
I submit that the statutory purposes of zoning are perverted from their intended application
when used to justify Chinese walls of exclusion on the borders of roomy or developing
municipalities for the actual purpose of keeping out all but the "right kind" of people or
those who will live in a certain kind and cost of dwelling. What restrictions like minimum
house size requirements, overly large lot area regulations, and complete limitations of
dwellings to single family units really do is bring about community-wide economic
segregation.12
-J. Hall, dissenting opinion, Vickers v. Township Committee of Gloucester
Township13
Over seventy years ago, in the case of Village ofEuclid v. Ambler Realy Co. , the Supreme
Court ruled that a zoning ordinance was an appropriate use of the municipality's police power, and
that the ordinance was constitutional in that the end use was to protect health, safety, and the
general welfare of the Village. The plaintiff, a landowner, claimed that the ordinance, which was part
12 181 A. 2d. 147 (1962)
13 181 A 2d. 129, 140 (1962), certiorari denied, 771 U.S. 233 (1963).
14 272 U.S. 365 (1926)
of a comprehensive plan to divide the municipality into six classes of use districts, separating
industrial, commercial and residential, resulted in a "taking" of their property, as the plaintiff's land
was devalued by the "industrial" development restriction on his parcel. The plaintiff claimed the due
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which required "just compensation" to be paid for the
loss. The Court held that the municipality's ability to designate certain uses was valid, and did not
violate due process unless the plan had "no foundation in reason and [was] a mere arbitrary and
irrational exercise of power having no substantial relation to the public health, the public morals, the
public safety or public welfare.15"
Charles Dale concludes from this ruling, "local zoning authority could be constrained only
by the limits of the Federal and State constitution or considerations of "general public interest." For
the most part, the Court over the next 40 years deferred to the judgment of local authorities by
dismissing appeals or denying petitions for certiorari (Dale p.CRS-2)." Beginning in the late 1960s,
the focus of land use litigation has shifted as a consequence of cases challenging exclusionary zoning.
Recognizing that most zoning regulations could pass the Euclid due process test, the court in Arlington
Heights, and other cases of this nature, have sought to subject exclusionary zoning actions which
operate to limit housing opportunities for low and moderate income groups, to more exacting
standards of review under the Equal Protection Clause (Dale p.CRS-3,5).
The Concept of Exclusionary Zoning
Legal commentators have defined exclusionary zoning as land use regulation which raises the price of
residential access to a particular area and thereby denies that access to members of low-income
groups (Sager p. 1 1). Norman Williams defined six exclusionary devices that are typically embedded
in zoning ordinances. They are exclusion of multiple family dwellings, restrictions on the number of
bedrooms in multiple family dwellings, exclusion of mobile homes, minimum building size
requirements, minimum lot size requirements, and minimum lot width requirements (Williams 1975).
The concept and impact of exclusionary zoning is well defined in the rhetorical question posed by
urban planner and professor Yale Rabin:
Why is it that older black neighborhoods in many American cities are frequently interspersed
with land-uses.. .which are intrusive, disruptive, even hazardous, and which degrade the
residential environment? Is it because blacks are forced into these already hostile
surroundings by the pressures of segregation? Or have these incompatible activities
somehow intruded into established black residential neighborhoods isolated by segregation?
15 272 U.S. 395
There may well be some examples of blacks moving next to junkyards; but my own
experience suggests that the junkyard moving into the black neighborhood is the more
common pattern, and that zoning has played a prominent role in the process. 16
Professor Jon Dubin draws out the link between environmental justice and zoning, pointing out,
"Local governments' exclusionary zoning laws remain a significant ongoing land use planning
impediment to African-American residential mobility. These zoning enactments create financial
barriers to residential access virtually as effective in operation as the explicitly racial laws invalidated
in Buchanan. Exclusionary zoning and planning techniques have been described as both
"innumerable and interchangeable" and include a plethora of devices that increase the cost of
housing, impede the development of low-cost or subsidized housing, or preclude or discourage
residential housing altogether (Dubin p.755)."
The literature on the use of zoning as an exclusionary device to keep out low-income and
minority groups is vast.17 These studies provide information on the movement in the early 1900s to
legalize residential segregation through the use of zoning, and the persistent problem of isolation and
congestion in inner-cities that is a result of land use controls in the suburbs. Perhaps the most
important aspect of the literature on exclusionary zoning is the development of the idea of the role of
the courts, especially the U.S. Supreme court, in interpreting cases of discrimination brought against
municipalities.
The precedents set in these cases have directly influenced the ability of environmental justice
advocates to successfully challenge perceived inequities today. In examining the legal history of
exclusionary zoning and judicial decisions at the state and federal court levels,18Marsha Ritzdorf
provides several conclusions concerning the legal barriers to litigating challenges of unequal
protection. Ritzdorf writes:
The Supreme Court's decisions are the only ones that automatically must be considered in
every state. "A state high court opinion, no matter how well reasoned and persuasive, is
binding only in the state in which it is delivered. U.S. Supreme Court opinions are literally
the law of the land and consequently preclude the possibility of other approaches." 19 In
plain language, this means that as we approach the twenty-first century, African-Americans'
16 Taken from Dubin 1993, p. 742. Yale Rabin, The Junkyard Nextdoor: Expulsive Zoning in Black
Neighborhoods 2 (Sept. 1, 1988) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
17 See e.g., (Babcock and Bosselman 1973; Bergman 1974; Bullard 1994; Dubin 1993; Haar 1996; Mandelker
1995; Payne 1988; Rabin 1989; Sager 1969; Thomas and Ritzdorf 1997; Williams 1955).
18 Buchanan v. Warley, Washington v. Davis, Village of Belle Terre v. Borass, Warth v. Seldin, Metropolitan Housing
Development Corporation v. Village ofArlington Heights, and finally Southern Burlington NA A. C.P. v. Township of Mount
Laurel
19 Haar and Kayden, Landmark Justice, 16.
ability to challenge exclusionary zoning as a violation of their constitutional rights is virtually
nonexistent. Only if they make a case under the existing fair housing statutes will their
voices be heard (Thomas and Ritzdorf p.54).
Ritzdorf draws on the work of Daniel Mandelker to conclude, "The Supreme Court has substantially
limited attacks on exclusionary zoning based on claims of racial discrimination under the equal
protection clause. Wholesale attacks on exclusionary zoning brought by non-residents are foreclosed
in Warth. Arlington Heights indicates that the Court will uphold site-specific racial discrimination
claims only in blatantly racial cases. A municipality can apparently zone its entire area for single-
family development and defend a refusal to rezone for multifamily development as consistent with its
'zoning factors' 20 (Thomas and Ritzdorf p.54)."
Exclusionary Zoning in the Courts
Even if prejudice were regarded as every individual's own business, discrimination, i.e.-
prejudice translated into action- has such devastating effects upon large segments of the
population that it is clearly everybody's business (Williams 1955, 349).
Prior to the mid-1960s, however, exclusionary zoning litigation had focused mainly on attacking
economic exclusion, most often avoiding the issue of racial discrimination specifically.21 "The issue
of environmental discrimination was just as present four decades ago as today, but because of
different perspectives of society, little litigation ensued. Thus, in the 1950s urban renewal would be
imposed on minority communities, and freeways would be sited in parks and ghettoes, 22 with
relatively few cases filed. In the 1960s and 1970s, many of the issues discussed in the environmental
justice context today were raised in the exclusionary/large-lot zoning litigation 23 as well as in the
denial of municipal services cases24 (Binder p.164)."
After 1965, zoning ordinances were more frequently challenged in the state courts on the
issue of race. "In the 1970's, developers and affordable housing advocates began challenging
exclusionary zoning practices in the courts, and by 1975, their challenges appeared to have met with
20 Daniel Mandelker, Land Use Law, 3rd ed. (Charlottesville, VA: Michie Company, 1993), 322-23/
21 There were several exceptions to the rule. In Buchanan v. Warey, 245 U.S. 60, 38 S. Ct. 16 (1917) and
Philbrook v. Chapel Housing Authority Hill, 269 N.C. 598, 153 S.E.2d. 153 (1967), plaintiffs challenged zoning
ordinances which blatantly discriminated against "people of color" by not allowing them to occupy housing
within the city.
22 See, e.g., Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
23 Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975); Village ofArington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1976);
Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 336 A.2d 713 (N.J. 1975) ("Mount Laurel I");
Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 456 A.2d 390 (N.J. 1983) ("Mount Laurel II");
Hills Dev. Co. v. Township of Bernards, 510 A.2d 621 (N.J. 1986) ("Mount Laurel III"); Arnel Dev. Co. v. City of Costa
Mesa, 620 P.2d 565 (Cal. 1980); Briseno v. City of Santa Ana, 6 Cal. App. 4th 1378 (1992).
remarkable success. In its landmark opinion in Southern Burlington Coung NAACP v. Township of Mount
Laurel,25 the New Jersey Supreme Court held that exclusionary zoning violated equal protection and
substantive due process guarantees in the state constitution, and ruled that New Jersey municipalities
had to meet their "fair share" of the "regional need" for low and moderate-income housing
(Weinstein 1993, 105)." Exclusionary zoning cases heard by the U.S. Supreme Court, however, were
less successful for plaintiffs challenging housing opportunities on equal protection grounds.
Several cases heard during the 1970s developed the standard of review for challenges to the
constitutionality of various zoning ordinances on equal protection grounds. Dandridge v. Williams26
supported the concept that if the court found a "rational relationship" between the language of an
ordinance and the furthering of a legitimate government objective, an equal protection challenge was
invalid. In this case, the court ruled that "an ordinance does not deny equal protection simply
because its classifications are not mathematically precise or because some inequaliy resultsfrom its
application (emphasis added)." 27 Likewise in Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas28the court ruled that a zoning
ordinance, which in this case stated that two or more unrelated people could not occupy a single-
family residence, was not at odds with the Equal Protection clause as it met the "rational
relationship" test of supporting a legitimate government interest. Since the ordinance embodied
neither a "suspect" classification 29 nor infringed a "fundamental" right30, the law was sustained as the
type of "economic and social legislation where legislatures have historically drawn lines which we
respect against the charge of violation of the Equal Protection Clause, if the law be "reasonable, not
arbitrary." 31 (Dale 1976, CRS4-6).
This ruling had implications on future litigation involving the equal protection clause, as the
court held that income is not a "suspect classification" and intimates that housing is not a
"fundamental right," therefore the courts would not apply more exacting standards to challenges
based on the exclusion of housing opportunities for low-income people, only on claims of racial
discrimination. If racial discrimination was found, the courts then looked to the "compelling interest
24 United States v. C4 of Black Jack, 508 F. 2d 1179 ( 8 th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1042 (1974); Ammonds v.
Dade CiG, 783 F.2d 982 (11th Cir. 1983); Dowdell v. CiG ofApopka, 698 F 2d. 1181 (11th Cir. 1983); Baker P. City of
Kissimmee, 645 F. Supp. 571 (M.D. Fla. 1986).
25 67 N.J. 151, 336 A. 2d 713 (1975)
26 397 U.S. 471 (1970)
27 397 U.S. at 473 (1970)
28 416 U.S. 1,8-9 (1974)
29 Black's Law Dictionary defines suspect classification as: "in constitutional law, a statutory classification based
on race, national origin, or alienage, and thereby subject to strict-scrutiny under equal protection analysis
30 Black's Law Dictionary defines fundamental rights as: "A right derived from natural or fundamental law. In
constitutional law, a right that triggers strict scrutiny of a law to determine whether the law violates the Due
Process Clause or the Equal Protection Clause; fundamental rights, as ennuciated by the Supreme Court,
include the right to vote, the right to interstate travel, and the various rights of privacy.
31 416 U.S. at 8
that justifies and necessitates the law in question" 32 to determine if the intent of the law was to
discriminate.
In James v. Valtierra33, the Supreme Court sustained a California constitutional provision
requiring the local electorate to approve construction of low-rent public housing before it began. In
so doing, it applied traditional equal protection standards finding, in effect, that the distinction in the
law was based on wealth and did not constitute race discrimination despite its asserted adverse
impact on housing opportunities for racial minorities. The Court stated: "The Article requires that
the referendum requirement approval for any low rent public housing project, not only for projects
which will be occupied by a racial minority. And the record here would not support any claim that a
law neutral on its face is in fact aimed at a racial minority." In other words, neither the fact that the
state law affected the poor generally, nor that housing interests were involved, was sufficient to
invoke strict judicial scrutiny (Dale 1976, CRS-5, CRS-6).
Alan Weinstein writes, "the U.S. Supreme Court all but barred federal court challenges to
exclusionary zoning based on the equal protection clause of the federal Constitution. First, in Warth
v. Seldin34 the Court imposed stringent standing requirements on exclusionary zoning plaintiffs.
Then, in Village ofArlington Heghts v. Metropolitan Housing Development Cop. 35 it required that
exclusionary zoning plaintiffs prove that municipal officials intended to engage in racial
discrimination (Weinstein 1993, 106)."
Justice Powell delivered the majority opinion of the court in Village ofArlington Hezhts
Metropolitan Housing Development Corp.:
Our decision last Term in Washington v. Davis36 made it clear that official action will not be
held unconstitutional solely because it results in a racially disproportionate impact.
'Disproportionate impact is not irrelevant, but it is not the sole touchstone of an invidious
racial discrimination'. Id., at 242. Proof of racial discriminatory intent of purpose is required
to show a violation of the Equal Protection Clause.37
The judicial holdings in these cases had significant impact on future exclusionary zoning challenges,
and the current ability of environmental racism challenges to use the 14th Amendment to seek relief.
The Court rulings in Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, James v. Valtierra, Washington v. Davis, and Village of
Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp, suggest that "persons whose interests are
32Blacks's Law Dictionary, strict scrutiny
33 402 U.S. 137 (1971)
34 422 U.S. 490 (1975)
3 429 U.S. 252 (1977)
36426 U.S. 229 (1976)
37 429 U.S. 252 (1977)
adversely affected by exclusionary aspects of local zoning ordinances have a heavy burden to
overcoming the traditional presumption of legislative validity (Dale 1976, CRS-7)."
The Discriminatory Intent Hurdle
The requirements to prove racial discrimination through the use of the Equal Protection
Clause as developed in exclusionary zoning cases is perhaps the most significant impediment to
litigating environmental justice concerns under constitutional law. As many attorneys involved in
environmental justice suggest, the holdings in these cases force communities to prove that the
situation they are challenging are the result of an intentional desire to discriminate. This is almost
impossible in the realm of government decision-making to find overt evidence of racial or economic
class discrimination in siting, housing, or other land use policies.
Although environmental justice litigants have provided courts with evidence showing the
discriminatory results of various policies and regulations, the courts have consistently held in terms
of the defendant for lack of proving intentional discrimination. The rationale for upholding the
intent requirement in these cases was voiced by the Supreme Court in the case of Washington v.
Davis8, where the majority opinion expressed the belief that without this requirement, "a whole
range of tax, welfare, public service, regulatory, and licensing statutes that may be more burdensome
to the poor and to the average black than to the affluent white" could possibly be void. This rationale
has held true since this decision was written, suggesting that while the rights granted under the
Fourteenth Amendment may seem to provide an outlet for communities to argue issues of unequal
protection, they may find it difficult to pursue claims that are not based solely on the suspect
classification of race.
The question remains; how to redress discriminatory decisions in land use policies resulting
in unfair living standards for low-income communities and communities of color? The fundamental
rights of justice, freedom, fairness, liberty and democracy that are the framework of the
environmental justice movement are essential to this country's tenet of social responsibility, therefore
it is important to seek solutions to this question. However, these fundamental rights differ from the
fundamental rights protected under the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Section III: An Alternative Suggestion: The Amicus Curiae Brief
The links between the claims made by environmental justice advocates, and the claims made
by plaintiffs in exclusionary zoning cases, that certain government actions or policies result in
38 426 U.S. at 248 (footnote omitted)
discriminatory outcomes based on race and income, provides for a central idea in this thesis. This
idea holds that the fundamental questions of land use reflected in environmental justice concerns are
so closely connected with the land use concerns expressed in exclusionary zoning litigation, that
exclusionary zoning is a category of environmental justice. This connection is drawn out in the
working definition of environmental justice as in the context of zoning, which is:
Any discriminatory decisions in land use policy in the form of zoning ordinances that
separate people, places, and work in an exclusionary manner that adversely effects the quality
of life of urban residents.
This connection was made in part because of the similarities between the claims made in exclusionary
zoning and environmental justice cases. But it also relies on the fact that the outcomes and
interpretations of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment in exclusionary zoning
cases have had an impact on environmental racism cases.
The failure of the use of this Constitutional law in redressing claims of discrimination in
hazardous facility siting, housing opportunities, and other locally unwanted land uses, supports the
original idea of this thesis, that in order for environmental justice (and therefore exclusionary zoning)
to be served through the court system, an alternative to formal litigation should be considered.
Sections I & II of this Chapter have shown the difficulties in seeking relief to claims of
environmental injustice under environmental and constitutional law. The unequal protection and
enforcement of environmental laws which spurs claims of environmental racism can be remedied to
a certain degree by challenging hazardous facility siting, but these lawsuits do not often address the
principles of environmental justice. While halting additional facility sitings improves the urban
environment and empowers a community, these successes in court only treat the symptoms, not the
disease. Alice Kaswan, a Professor of Law at Catholic University School of Law, expands on this
issue of "bridging the gap" between litigation and environmental justice. In a recent issue of the
American University Law Review, she writes;
"While all of these legal challenges may accomplish the desired end (e.g., they may defeat a
proposal to site a locally unwanted land use ["LULU"] in a poor minority neighborhood),
they do not directly address the perceived unfairness of the decision-making process or its
distributional outcomes. Suits against wetland permits, zoning code violations, or hearing
notifications will not, generally speaking, raise the issues of justice that may have motivated
the suits. As stated by attorney Michael Gerrard, '[w]here the communities are able to
participate in the legal process to fight facilities, often they are required to focus on
objectives that are peripheral to their substantive concerns' (Kaswan p.244)."
Kaswan argues "a legal victory against an unfair decision-whether on civil rights or other grounds-
is only one element in the pursuit of the broader social, political, and cultural change necessary to
achieving political processes that fairly consider all citizen's interests (Kaswan p.224)."
While environmental justice advocates have turned to the Civil Rights Acts39 , especially Title VII140
(known as the Fair Housing Act) because of the less exacting standard of discriminatory impact
rather than intent, the use of this route has few precedents. All told, the findings in sections 1 & 2
reflect what many attorneys involved in environmental justice have professed, "that the struggles in
the environmental justice movement are primarily political and economic struggles, not legal ones
(Cole 1994, 541)."
But if we take it as given that the courts are important public policy making forums, and that
litigation is often necessary, the strategies of environmental justice advocates entering this forum
should reflect an approach educated by the doctrines established by the courts in exclusionary zoning
cases. Owing to the constraints of existing laws, and based on the notion expressed above by Gerrard
that the legalese inherent in these suits may take away from the real concerns, the third chapter of
this thesis describes an alternative mechanism for communicating environmental justice to the
judiciary. This alternative mechanism is the amicus curiae brief, which can provide environmental
justice advocates access to the courts without entering into formal litigation.
3 In North Carolina Dept. of Transp. v. Crest St. Community Council, Inc., 479 U.S. 6 (1986), a community
group successfully used Title VI to pursue a challenge to a freeway siting project. This case ended in a
negotiated settlement rerouting the freeway. "This represents the first successful use of Title VI to stop a
locally-unwanted land use, albeit at the administrative level (Cole 1994 p. 5 33)."
40 U.S. v. City of Parma, 494 F. Supp. 1049 (N.D.Ohio 1980)
Chapter Three: Introduction to Amicus Curiae Briefs
Where there is relatively adequate representation of the basic points of view, the amicus
curiae, however, may perform a valuable subsidiary role by introducing subtle variations of
the basic argument, or emotive and even questionable arguments that might result in a
successful verdict, but are too risky to be embraced by the principal litigant.
- Samuel Krislov, 1962
One method of reform is to create mechanisms that will give community groups greater
access to the courts. It is the leverage accorded by enhanced access to courts, rather than
actual litigation, that will serve to correct environmental inequities by removing the
economic and political incentives that drive environmental hazards to these communities.
- Eileen Gauna, 1995
From Fourteenth Century Common Law to the Present
Black's Law Dictionary defines amicus curiae (Latin "friend of the court") as:
"A person who is not a party to the lawsuit but who petitions the court to file a brief in the
action because that person has a strong interest in the subject matter."
Amicus curiae briefs are documents that are filed by parties interested in providing the court
with additional information in a particular case. An amicus can submit a brief before a court's
consideration of a petition for writ of certiorari, motion for leave to file a bill of complaint,
jurisdictional statement, or petition for an extraordinary writ.41 The briefs can take the form of a
memo, or a formal document written (often by a lawyer), to express the concerns of a person or a
group in terms of a specific case. Anyone can file a brief if it is accompanied by the written consent
of the parties. If a party denies consent, a motion for leave to file an amicus brief may be presented
directly to the court.42
Although briefs are most often filed when a case is at the appellate level, they may be filed at
any stage during the history of a case so long as they follow the guidelines for filing specific to that
41 U.S. Supreme Court Rule 37
42 No motion for leave to file an amicus curiae brief is necessary if the brief is presented on behalf of the
United States by the Solicitor General; on behalf of a State, Commonwealth, territory or possession when
submitted by its Attorney General; or on behalf of a city, county, town or similar entity when submitted by its
authorized law officer.
court.43 "Higher appellate level decisions frequently have ramifications far beyond the particular
litigants to the suit in question. Appellate courts usually welcome amicus briefs filed by nonparties
who can apprise the court of broad-based legal, social and economic consequences of a judicial
decision (Parlee p.14)."
Initially, the amicus was an impartial judicial advisor called upon only in rare or unique
circumstances (Krislov 1963). However, the role of amicus participation has changed significantly
since the days of impartiality. The evolution of the amicus brief has followed the increased use of
the court system to settle disputes. The literature suggests that amicus may actually play a role in the
court's agenda setting, as the court is more likely to hear a case with amicus support because such
support suggests the case is important (Epstein 1993).
A recent study of Supreme Court decision-making found that these submissions potentially
enable justices to make more precise calculations. This finding is based on the argument that in friend-
of-the-Court submissions, organized interests engage in preference delineation, pointing out to the
justices where various political actors stand on extant policy (Epstein and Knight p.222). Epstein and
Knight note that the litigating parties may also provide this information, but other studies have shown
that "since litigants are more likely to be narrowly focused on the case outcomes, the broader policy
ramifications of the decision may not be discussed in their brief (Spriggs and Walhbeck, forthcoming)."
A Short History of the Amicus Curiae Brief
Scholars have traced the origin of the amicus curiae back to fourteenth-century Anglo-
American common law and Roman law (Lowman 1992). In the United States, the briefs originated in
common law as a response to the absence of a mechanism for representation of third-party interests
in the adversary system (Smith and Terrell 1995). Smith and Terrell note that "the amicus curiae first
appeared in the United States in 1821 when Henry Clay represented the landholding interests of the
state of Kentucky in Green v. Biddle, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 1 (1823).44
Clay acted as a "quasi-litigating" amicus curiae in this case, although the term had not been
formalized at the time, because he also argued this case before the court. This type of amicus
participation, a move from neutrality to interest, or advocacy, develops when an amicus is allowed to
participate in oral testimony, arguing for one viewpoint in the case. While the amicus may still
operate under the guise of neutrality, the litigating amicus more often adopts the platform of one
party in a case and develops their argument accordingly (Lowman 1992).
43 These "guidelines" can take the form, as in the case of the federal courts of appeals, as rules listed in the
Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure. Each state has slightly different rules governing the use of amicus briefs,
and the requirements for filing.
After the 1820s
The role of amicus participation evolved quickly in the U.S. courts since 1823, following
vague guidelines that were essentially up to the discretion of court to establish. Krislov marks the
shift in the development of amicus curiae in the Supreme Court with the case of Florida v. Georgia45,
heard in 1854. As in many current cases involving states as parties in a litigation, the Attorney
General of the United States requested permission for leave to file an amicus brief. Counsel for the
states subsequently denied the request, so it was therefore up to the Court to decide the matter. The
United States was later granted the right to participate by the majority of the court, and has continued
to participate in disputes of this nature since that time.
From Neutrality to Partisanship
After the 1920s, states and organizations started to participate as amicus curiae and the use
of the briefs began to be seen as an outlet for groups to influence, or lobby the courts. Judges
recognized that there were often many public interests impacted by their decisions in a case, and
viewed amicus participation as a means to understanding the societal implications of a holding.
Epstein and Knight (1999) argue that organized interests-participating as amici curiae- play a role for
justices similar to that lobbyists play for legislators: they provide information about the preferences
of other actors, who are relevant to that ability of justices to attain their primary goal-to generate
efficacious policy that is as close as possible to their ideal points (215).46 The use of the amicus brief
gradually became a major means of affecting social change through the courts and of implementing
broad public policies as advocated either by government or private citizens (Re 1984).
The role of amicus curiae has evolved from what today would be called a "special master" to the
court, providing technical information to the court upon their solicitation, to an outlet for explaining a
different argument then those presented by the litigating parties, to organized interests often supporting
both their own beliefs and those of one particular party. Today it is somewhat uncommon to see amicus
curiae participation by third parties who do not overtly support one party to a case, as the briefs are now
often solicited by the attorney for a party, and written to support that party's brief.
The increased use of this legal tool since the late 1950s is well documented in the literature
analyzing interest group participation as amicus. Studies of interest group amicus participation in
Supreme Court cases decided between 1958 and 1965 showed that amici participated in about one
third of the total cases (Hakman 1966). Subsequent research found that during the 1970's interest
44 Smith and Terrell, 1995
4s 58 U.S. (17 How.) 478 (1854)
groups filed amicus briefs in fifty-three percent of the non-commercial cases decided by the court
(O'Connor & Epstein 1982). One decade later, the use of these briefs increased almost thirty
percent. A recent survey of the 1996 Term of the Supreme Court found that 204 amicus briefs were
filed in the 45 cases analyzed in the study (Schacter 1998).
These studies have generally found that aimicus briefs did provide significant information to
the courts, were likely to impact the courts decision to hear a case, and in some cases directly
impacted public policy. The extent to which amicus participation influences judges and impacts
holdings in a case is more difficult to prove. The mere fact that many interest groups have adopted
the use of amicus briefs into their general public policy missions suggests to many scholars that these
submissions serve as policy-making tools.
Amicus Curiae: Use, Influence and Impact
"One can argue that these briefs improve, or even 'democratize,' interpretative litigation by
expanding the scope of perspectives before the Court. Particularly if we see interpretative
cases as presenting the Court with policy sensitive choices in many cases, there can be real
fractional advantages to the filing of briefs by engaged and informed interests."
- Jane Schacter, 1998
It is difficult to say exactly how amicus curiae briefs influence the Court. Amici may shape
the thinking of the Court, yet remain uncited in the written opinion. Susan Hedman's doctoral
dissertation 47 tried to answer the question of influence and impact of amici curiae briefs on the
Supreme Court environmental docket. Hedman examined "O'Connor and Epsteins hypothesis that
citations of amicus briefs in court decisions serve as "blunt indicators" of amici impact. The study
demonstrates that citations are exceedingly "blunt indicators" of amici impact. In fact, only about
one-third of the amicus citations in the environmental cases decided by the Supreme Court can be
characterized as evidence of interest group impact (Hedman 1991)."
Amici on the Environmental Docket
Hedman reports that there is some data that indicates that amicus briefs filed on the merits of a case
influence the court simply by being filed. Caldeira & Wright concluded that:
Organized interests are generally influential during the Court's agenda phase because they
solve an informational problem for the justices... (by) effectively communicating to the
46 By "efficacious" policy, we mean policy that other political actors and society as a whole will follow and
respect. By "ideal point," we mean the justice's preferred position on the policy.
47 "Friends of the earth as friends of the Court: Interest groups as amid curiae in environmental litigation before
the United States Supreme Court" (Ph.D. diss., University of Wisconsin, 1989)
justices information about the array of forces at play in the litigation, who is at risk, and the
number and variety of parties regarding the litigation as significant. (Caldeira and Wright
1988, 1122).
Hedman's (1991) detailed examination of the 14 environmental cases in which the court cited
interest group amicus briefs reveals that in five cases the Court cited and rejected arguments by
amici, explicitly noting that these amici did not shape the outcome of the case. Citations which
indicate strong evidence of impact appear in only five of the environmental cases decide by the
Court... approximately 5% of the cases in which interest groups filed amicus briefs.48 In this study of
the Supreme Court environmental docket, Hedman found several cases where the amici were
favorably cited by the justices:
In Nollan v. California Coastal Commission49, a land use case involving the validity of a building
permit provision, the Court found for the first time that a takings occurs when there is a
"lack of nexus" between land use regulations or development exactions and a valid public
purpose. In establishing this legal rule, the Court noted that it was relying on legal authority
contained exclusively in an interest group amicus brief. This is strong evidence suggesting
that interest group amici had an impact on the Nollan court's majority and, in doing so, had
an impact on the evolution of land use law (Hedman 1991).
In San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. San Diego, another takings case heard in 198150, Hedman's survey of
the court record found that an amicus brief filed by the National Association of Home Builders was
influential in the way that Justice Brennan decided the issue of ripeness. "When Justice Brennan
cited the NAH's amicus brief as authority in a threshold issue in his landmark dissent, he
demonstrated one more way in which an interest group amicus brief might have an impact on the
Court (Hedman 1991, 200)." Hedman concludes that this research demonstrates the possibility that
amicus briefs influence the Court, but found that the briefs rarely have an impact on the final holding
(Hedman 1991).
Interest Group Participation: Railroads, Securities, Minorities and the Environment
The function of an amicus curiae is to call the court's attention to law or facts or
circumstances in a matter then before it that may otherwise escape its consideration.
-Kemp v. Rubin, 187 Misc. 707, 64 NYS 2d. 510
48 484 U.S. 469 (1988); 483 U.S. 825 (1987); 471 U.S. 84 (1985); 450 U.S. 621 (1981); 405 U.S. 727 (1972)
49483 U.S. 825 (1987)
5 450 U.S. 621 (1981)
Among the private interest groups which were the first to utilize the opportunities of
broader access (to the courts) were racial minority groups, securities and insurance interests, and
railroad interests (Krislov 1963). Many organizations, both public and private, have established their
positions on different issues through the repeated use of amicus curiae briefs at the state and federal
court levels. Groups like the American Jewish Council, the National Association for the
Advancement of Colored People (NAACP, now NAACP Legal Defense), the American Civil
Liberties Union (ACLU), and the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), have developed their
respective interests before the court through long histories of participating as amicus curiae.
Beginning in the early 1970's, environmental organizations such as the Environmental Defense Fund,
Natural Resources Defense Council, National Wildlife Federation, Friends of the Earth, Sierra Club
and the National Audubon Society, to name a few, started to file amicus briefs (Hedman 1991).
In his extensive study of the history of amicus participation, Krislov analyzes the use of
these briefs by civil rights organizations. Krislov writes:
The identification of the NAACP with amicus briefs is not merely a contemporary one, for
that organization has, since its inception, participated as amicus curiae in litigation. An early
case in point is Guinn v. United States,51 the famous Grandfather Clause case, where the
NAACP justified its participation on the grounds that 'the vital importance of these
questions to every citizen of the United States, whether white or colored, seems amply to
warrant the submission of the brief 52 (Krislov 1963, 707).
While a series of "discrete and insular minorities" of a fiscal and commercial nature early found the
amicus curiae brief a useful and potent instrument, it was the use of the device by civil rights
organizations that drew widespread public attention. The American Civil Liberties Union was most
active in this, as in other aspects of fostering minority group activity (Krislov, 1963, 709). An
increased reliance on litigation as a means of vindicating minority rights otherwise difficult to obtain
through the political process, however, resulted in civil rights organizations such as the ACLU, and
the American Jewish Congress, being among the most active filers of amicus curiae briefs over the
past few years. 53
In two cases in which the ACLU participated as amicus curiae,54 the Supreme Court
favorably cited the briefs in the written decision. 55 Pfeffer points out that the court struck down a
51 238 U.S. 347 (1915)
52 Brief for NAACP as Amicus Curiae, p.2 , Guinn v. United States, supra note 72.
s3 In Krislov, p. 710, see Sonnenfeld, Participation of Amici Curiae by Filing Briefs and Presenting Oral
Arguments in Decisions of the Supreme Court, 1949-1957 11,16 (Michigan State University Governmental
Research Bureau, 1958).
s Epperson v. Arkansas 393 U.S. 97 (1968) and Metromedia, Inc. v. San Diego 453 U.S. 643 (1981).
s Although Hedman concluded that these citations only offered "anecdotal" evidence that amicus briefs can
impact the Court.
statute on grounds raised solely in an amicus brief filed by the American Civil Liberties Union
(ACLU) and American Jewish Congress (Pfeffer 1981). In the second case, which focused on
protections for political speech, the ACLU brief is thought to have been instrumental in attracting
swing votes to Justice White's plurality opinion striking down a San Diego billboard ban (Ennis 1984,
607). The ACLU's experience in Epperson and Metromedia suggests that it is possible for interest
group amici to have an impact on the Court (Hedman, 1991, 190).
The APA and the SEC: Examples of Involvement
The SEC filed its first brief in 1936 and now participates on average approximately forty-five
cases a year (Ruder 1989). Ruder's analysis of SEC participation as amicus revealed that the agency's
commitment to utilizing these briefs developed from an understanding that the amicus brief is a
policy making tool of great importance (Ruder p. 1 168). This understanding was based, in part, on
the general "success" of the SEC in judicial decisions in favor of the views that the SEC supported.
The courts quoted the amicus brief of the SEC in two cases heard in the 1970s, and expressed their
regret that the SEC did not file briefs in four cases heard between 1954-1988 (Ruder 1989).
The American Planning Association ("APA"), like the Securities and Exchange Commission,
has an amicus curiae committee to establish criteria to determine the types of cases that speak to the
policies of the organization, and therefore merit participation as amicus. The 1990 guidelines for
intervention as amicus include cases that "implicate APA policy positions," "concern fundamental
constitutional principles," "involve new planning/regulatory approaches," or "involve
planning/regulatory approaches with undefined legal status." These guidelines essentially mirror
those of the SEC, although the reasons for filing briefs are slightly different due to the fact that the
SEC has certain powers as a federal agency, and the APA is a membership organization.
Since the Commission's regulatory program relies on the same statutes as those involved in
private cases, resolution of legal issues in those cases often affects the Commission's own
enforcement and rulemaking (Ruder 1989). The SEC therefore sees the amicus brief as a way to
influence rules governing the behavior of the organization, and as a mechanism for communicating
their position on litigation involving matters of public interest in line with the policy of the SEC.
The APA and other membership organizations file briefs with the knowledge that some of
their members hold various positions of authority. As one employee of the APA noted earlier this
year, "we have members in regulatory positions that may be affected by the APA filing briefs in land
use cases that are similar to their own local land use planning policies." The APA has only once
received complaints from their members that the organization supported the wrong planning
position in an amicus brief, suggesting that people outside of the courtroom read these briefs, and
may also consider these briefs important policy documents.
Both the SEC and the APA carefully scrutinize any amicus briefs filed by their respective
organizations, as the briefs inform the court of the policy positions held by the groups at the time.
Because these briefs are a respected form of communication between these groups and the courts,
significant attention is paid to the consistency of the positions taken in briefs filed in different courts
throughout the year.
In examining the access to the courts for public interest groups through amicus curiae briefs in
England, Australia, and the United States, Loretta Re writes:
The development of the amicus device has been favoured in the United States by the
proliferation in its society of the private non-profit organization which exist to promote at the bar of
the courts, before legislatures, and in public opinion, the interests of a class or group and their
conviction about the value of some social interest-whether it be the advancement of a minority race,
or the advocacy of an environmental or consumer interest. Whereas the wealthy groups and
associations were able to exercise considerable political control through political lobbies, the Civil
Rights organisations, with few economic resources at their disposal, resorted instead to using the
courts to achieve social change by means of amicus curiae (Re 1984).
As has been shown, groups operating under government regulations, such as the SEC, might
file amicus briefs in cases addressing questions of law or application of existing law, that would
directly impact their operations. Civil liberties groups and other public advocacy organizations often
filed briefs both in cases of immediate relevance to the doctrine of their group, and in more general
cases that may have lacked representation of different societal interests.
Recognition from the Court
The filing of amicus briefs increased throughout the twentieth century partially as a result of the
recognition of the importance of amicus briefs by some judges and justices. As Justice Black noted in
regard to a decision to revise the guidelines for filing amicus briefs in the US Supreme Court in 1954:
Most of the cases before this Court involve matters that affect far more people than the
immediate record parties. I think the public interest and judicial administration would be better
served by relaxing rather than tightening the rule against amicus curiae briefs. 56
56 Order Adopting Revised Rules of Supreme Court of the United States, 346 US 945 (1954).
In December 1988, the Court of Appeals for the State of New York added a new announcement 57 to the
weekly bulletin presenting new filings, stating "the subject matter of the newly filed cases may suggest
appropriate motions and participation which the Court welcomes (Kaye 1989)." Judith Kaye, then
Associate Judge for the Court of Appeals in Albany, New York, looked at this invitation to submit
amicus briefs as a statement deserving "small fanfare", because in her opinion:
The cases settle disputes between litigants to be sure, but they may also establish rules and set
policies that go far beyond them, profoundly affecting the course of future cases and influencing
the conduct of others in society (Kaye p.9).
While amicus briefs have been shown to provide the courts with additional information in a case, that
information is sometimes not considered "useful" by the court. "In recent years, the Supreme Court has
been flooded with amicus curiae briefs in most major cases involving important constitutional or
statutory issues. Many of those briefs contribute nothing significant to the case, but merely repeat, in
varying form, the arguments the parties already made. Their major function seems to be to enable
organizations submitting them to gain publicity and to be able to advise their memberships after the
decision that the Court adopted their views (Friedman 1983)."
Criticism of Amici as Lobbyists and "Parrots"
Criticism of the overuse of amicus briefs that mimic party briefs, or are filed for reasons
other than that of a "friend" to the court, was seen most recently in the Seventh Circuit court of
Chief Judge Richard Posner in his denial of a motion by the Chicago Board of Trade to file an
amicus brief in the case of John H. Ryan v. Commodities Futures Trading Comm'n58 heard in 1997. Judge
Posner provided a lengthy explanation as to why he had denied the motion to file an amicus brief,
stating, among other things, that justices needed to place restrictions on the use of the briefs to
simply repeat the argument of the party. He writes,
We are not helped by an amicus curiae's expression of a 'strongly held belief about the
weight of the evidence, but by being pointed to considerations germane to our decisions of
the appeal that the parties for one reason or another have not brought to our attention. 59
The amicus brief loses its meaning as a helpful tool to educate the court with new and essential
information when it is written with only the opposition in mind. Posner described several situations
in which he believed amicus curiae participation should be allowed, or provided reason for their
'desirability' before the court:
57 (22 NYCRR §500.11[e]).
58 125 F. 3d 1062 (7th Cir. 1997)
59 125 F. 3d at 1064
I. When a party is not represented completely or at all,
II. When an amicus has an interest in another case that will be affected, and
III. When the amicus has "unique information or perspective that can help the court
beyond the help that the lawyers for the parties are able to provide.60
While the U.S. Supreme Court may accept most motions for leave to file amicus briefs, some state
supreme courts are not as flexible. In Arkansas, for example, a case heard in 198361 on appeal
received a statement from the court similar to that of Judge Posner, causing many future potential
amicus to shy away from filing (Marshall 1996). The Court stated, "henceforth, we will deny
permission to file a brief when the purpose of the brief is nothing more than to make a political
endorsement of the basic brief."62
Lawyers and scholars have tried to provide some reasons for votes against amicus
participation other than the argument that the sheer volume of briefs filed per case has formed these
judicial opinions. "The concern seems to be that parties and their counsel will use amici to present
additional arguments they cannot (because of page limitations or for other reasons) fully present in
their own briefs-perhaps even ghostwriting and/or financing briefs (Smith 1998)." Smith believes
that the real concern stems from the credibility of the organizations filing briefs, and the inability of
the judges or justices to discern "good" data from "bad". In some cases63 , the organization filing the
amicus brief have the credentials to make empirical assessments that carry more weight than the
individual party making the claim (Smith 1998). Other lawyers consider this situation simply the role
of the amicus curiae brief, not questioning the neutrality or fairness of what is contained in the
documents.
Although critics have noted that the shift of the amicus from a neutral 'friend' to a lobbyist
for a certain cause has created briefs that look more like propaganda pieces than thoughtful legal
tools, (Rustad and Koenig 1993) Krislov concludes his 1962 article by stating:
Access to the legal process on the part of such organizations is a logical extension of
realistic awareness of law as a process of social choice and policy making. Even criticism of the
amicus brief as 'political propaganda', court embarrassment at such criticism, and changes in the rules
which have hampered such briefs in the short run have not seriously stemmed the growing reliance
upon it (Krislov p.721).
Amicus Curiae Brief May Be Useful to the Environmental Justice Movement
60 125 F. 3d at 1063
61 Ferguson v. Brick, 279 Ark. 168, 649 S.W. 2d 397 (1983)
62 169 Ark. At 173
63 See Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1 (1996)
The [Court of Appeals] exists, not for the individual litigant, but for the indefinite body of
litigants, whose causes are potentially involved in the specific cause at issue. The wrongs of
aggrieved suitors are only the algebraic symbols from which the court is to work out the
formula of justice.
-Benjamin Cardozo, before he joined the Court of Appeals6"
Luke Cole suggests that communities facing environmental dangers are in great need of relevant legal
research and writing (Cole 1994, 106). He notes four useful ways for this to take place, one of which is
writing amicus briefs in environmental justice cases. Cole states:
Writing scholarly amicus curiae briefs in environmental justice cases can be useful for
communities engaged in protracted legal struggles. Amicus briefs are excellent vehicles for
discussing the broader policy implications of a particular suit and the historical context of
the suit (Cole 1994, 1062).
This research into the history and use of amicus briefs in the courts uncovers many aspects of this
legal tool that can be translated into mechanisms for effective participation in the courts. There are
several features of amicus briefs that make them relevant in the environmental justice movement.
On the technical side, the briefs are significantly less expensive than litigating, and the rules of res
judicata and collateral estoppel do not apply to amicus. This means that amicus participation in a
case does not bar the filer from appearing as a party in similar litigation in the future. Therefore,
community groups can spend less time and money, and communicate their views before the court,
without focusing on how an unfavorable outcome may hurt subsequent involvement in the courts.
Local Expertise
On a more substantive level, research has shown that amicus briefs can influence the
decision of the court to choose to hear a case because they can present unique issues of importance
held by various individuals or organizations. Grassroots organizations with local expertise can file as
amici to inform the court that there is an audience and an interest in pertinent litigation, potentially
influencing the selection of cases for the docket.
"Because of page limits, or considerations of tone and emphasis, parties are frequently
forced to make some of the points they wish to make in rather abbreviated form (Ennis p.606)."
Environmental justice advocates can expand on those points that impact their interests specifically, in
their own voice, to widen the boundaries of a case to encompass their concerns. The amicus brief
can therefore allow communities to inform the court of their interests, and indicate how a holding
64 Cardozo, The Jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals of the State of New York § 6, at 11 (2d ed 1909)
will impact them specifically. This will help, in the words of Luke Cole, "build the movement," as
these briefs can move away from a narrow legal holding.
Providing a Different Perspective
Amicus can make arguments that the party for some reason or another can't make, and are
not restricted to presenting the formal legal arguments of a party. Because environmental justice
advocates have been unsuccessful in pursuing their claims through existing laws, an amicus brief can
allow these groups to voice their beliefs in their own terms, and present alternative arguments that
may not be contained in the party brief.
Environmental justice advocates participating as amici can promote an alternative reading of
the case. Rather than draw the court's attention to the negative aspects of the situation, the amici can
construct a positive argument based on the use of "good" zoning laws that take the place of
insufficient environmental laws. The amicus curiae brief offers environmental justice advocates an
opportunity to focus their local expertise on educating the court, in their own voice, to offer
interpretations of a case that transcends the legalese, without formally litigating.
A Better Means of Communicating Environmental Justice
The grassroots nature of environmental justice seems to lend itself to this flexible form of
communication with the court that an amicus brief provides. The legalese of a formal brief often
cannot reconstruct the emotions and sentiment that have caused communities to organize in the
name of environmental justice. The potential power of the information that people can document
from their every day life is important material that only experience provides.
In order to provide a stronger argument for the use of amicus briefs in the environmental
justice movement, the next chapter of this thesis will present four exclusionary zoning cases and a
summary of the information provided in the amicus briefs for each case. The information provided
in these briefs can help explain how other organizations have used these briefs to further their
concerns and policies, and to make recommendations to the court for particular rulings.
Each amicus brief was read in light of the brief filed by the party in litigation that they either
overtly supported, or appeared to support in their opening summary. In doing so, it is possible to
understand how amicus briefs can be used to present different arguments in a care, provide clarity to
technical questions asked by the court, and elaborate on issues that a party only mentioned. The
ideas presented in these amicus briefs can be used to better understand how this legal tool can be
used by environmental justice advocates to communicate with the court in a fashion other than
formal litigation.
Chapter Four: Exclusionary Zoning Cases andAmicus Briefs
The Cases and the Criteria for Selection
Amicus briefs filed for four land use cases were collected in order to understand the
"exportable" lessons that can be learned from past use of the briefs in litigation. The methodology
for choosing each case was fairly straightforward. To be selected, the case had to involve a dispute
concerning a zoning ordinance that as applied segregated a group or class of people by not allowing
equal access to housing opportunities, and that group or class had to have the support of at least one
amicus on the record. The initial selection of cases was narrowed down to include two cases heard
before the U.S. Supreme Court challenging the constitutional foundation of exclusionary zoning
cases, Buchanan v. Warlef 5 and Village ofArlington Heights v. Metropolitan Development Cop.6 6 , and two
cases heard before State Supreme Courts, Britton v. Town of Chester? and City of Cleburne v. Cleburne
Living Center68 .
The selection of cases was narrowed down to these four cases from an initial group of ten
due to lack of complete records at the various court record libraries, and because these four cases
provide a standard representation of the utility of the amicus curiae brief to illustrate additional
points not found in the party briefs. Each amicus brief filed in the respective cases was read in light
of the brief filed by the party the amicus was essentially supporting.
It is difficult to measure the ability of the amicus curiae brief to influence or impact the
decision-making process of judges unless the briefs are specifically cited on the record or in the
written opinion. The studies of interest group participation as amici and the literature on this topic
do suggest the ways in which some amicus briefs can be more effective or more useful than others.
The literature supports the idea that the authors of a brief, say the Solicitor General or a well known
lawyer, or the number of times a group submits a brief ("repeat players") can influence the court's
decision to allow a brief to be filed (Hedman 1989). Additional literature and interviews with lawyers
contribute to the claim that the substance of a brief and the interest of the amicus in filing a brief are
also indicators of the essential role that amicus can play in a court proceeding.
As Bruce Ennis points out, amicus briefs are often useful when the amicus and its counsel help
the party plan the party's strategy, and can provide research, drafting, and editorial assistance to the
party (Ennis 1984). Ennis' work supports one claim of this paper that participation by amicus is
important because there are many instances where the parties can't say exactly what they want.
65 245 U.S. 60 (1917)
66 517 F. 2d 409 (C.A. 7 1975)
67 134 N.H. 434, 595 A. 2d. 492 (1991)
68 473 U.S. 432 (1985)
Amici can develop the ideas that the party is forced to make in summary form, or they can make
arguments that the party wants to make, but for a variety of reasons69 , cannot make itself (Ennis
1984).
The cases challenge the notion of the fundamental liberty of citizens of low and moderate
income, people of color, and people with mental retardation, to acquire property or integrate into
communities. In asking the question of what the 14t Amendment accords people, the courts are
forced to consider the legitimate governmental interest furthered by the various zoning ordinances.
The division of power and purpose between the legislative and judicial branches, and the deference
to municipalities through the police power granted them by the state, create many levels within these
cases. The amici in these cases therefore serve an important role in helping the court interpret the
complexities of these land use cases in the eyes of third parties interested in the case.
Buchanan v. Warley 0
The facts of the case are as follows 71: Buchanan, plaintiff in error, brought an action in the
chancery branch of Jefferson circuit court of Kentucky for the specific performance of a contract for
the sale of certain real estate situated in the city of Louisville at the corner of Thirty-seventh street
and Pflanz avenue. The offer in writing to purchase the property contained a proviso that the
purchaser, the defendant in this case, was not required to accept that contract unless he had a right,
as a colored citizen, under the laws of the city and state to occupy that land as a resident.
Under and by virtue of the ordinance of the city of Louisville, approved May 11, 1914, the
defendant would not be allowed to occupy the lot as a place of residence.
The title of the ordinance reads:
An ordinance to prevent conflict and ill-feeling between the white and colored races in the city
of Louisville, and to preserve the public peace and promote the general welfare, by making
reasonable provisions requiring, as far as practicable, the use of separate blocks, for residences,
places of abode, and places of assembly by white and colored people respectively.
The plaintiff acknowledged that but for the ordinance, the state courts would have enforced the
contract, and the defendant would have been compelled to pay the purchase price and take a
conveyance of the premises. Buchanan attacked the constitutionality of the ordinance that prohibited
the purchase of such land by a colored person.
The Court held that the ordinance effectively deprived Buchanan, in violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment, of an essential element of his property, -the right to dispose of it to a
69 These reasons include pursuing one aspect of law in order to gain standing, only presenting the aspects of
law relevant to the case at bar, or providing the court with information in a format free of emotion.
70 245 U.S. 60 (1917)
71 The language utilized to describe the facts of this case are taken almost directly from the case law and the
Lexis Headnotes for this case.
constitutionally qualified purchaser, -and may attack the prohibition under the Fourteenth
Amendment. The Court found that the ordinance denied Warley the civil right to acquire, enjoy and
use property, which is guaranteed in equal measure to all citizens, white or colored, by the Fourteenth
Amendment. The ordinance was found to be an invalid exercise of the police power of the state.
The Amicus Briefs
In the case at bar there were three amici briefs filed which support the case of the plaintiff in
error. The amici represent the interests of the Baltimore Branch of the National Association for the
Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), and a counsel team from St. Louis, Missouri supported
by Wells H. Blodgett and Frederick W. Lehmann.
The NAACP Amicus Brief
The NAACP brief mentions segregation ordinances and codes in Virginia, North Carolina,
Atlanta, Georgia, and Louisville, Kentucky (the ordinance in question) as they relate to the zoning
ordinance passed in Baltimore, Maryland on May 15th, 1911. The brief details case law related to the
different ordinances and addresses how the ordinance in Baltimore has resulted in an overcrowding
of black residents in one section of town while homes remain vacant in the areas designated for
white inhabitants. The brief does not restrict statements to the specific question of the
constitutionality of the ordinance in question, but details at length the different aspects of the
ordinances passed in other cities with varying approval to suggest how the ordinance in Louisville
should be considered by the Court. The author for the NAACP writes:
To sustain this legislation it is necessary to establish by legal and constitutional method that
the colored man is a public nuisance, or that he is a menace to the public health, morals or
well being of the community. In what way has this been done? If it has not been done, in
what way can it be done? The most virulent advocate of this newly devised scheme of
adding burdens to the already overburdened shoulders of black men, could hardly be
brought to the point of making such claims. 72
This brief left the discussion of the intricacies of the Louisville ordinance up to the petitioner,
following the notion that briefs should add something new to the record. From the research on
effective amicus briefs, it is important to note that this brief contains excerpts from articles written
by Charles Bonaparte in the Baltimore Evening Sun on August 16th and September 20th, 1913. This may
have had some influence on the court, as Bonaparte's administration as Attorney General (1906-
1909) was a particularly aggressive one with far-reaching developments in cases involving Negro
rights and vindication of federal legislation before the courts (Krislov 1963).
72 Amicus brief for the NAACP,p.32
By explaining to the court how segregation has impacted the quality of life for people of
color in Baltimore and in other cities, detailing the subsequent cases that overturned these
ordinances, and citing the local views of a past Attorney General, this brief expands the courts
knowledge beyond Louisville, Kentucky. The filing of the NAACP brief allows the court to
understand the importance of the case at bar as it relates to the future of land policy throughout the
country. While the brief for the petitioner also lists and mentions segregation ordinances in other
cities, the amicus brief for the NAACP goes into greater detail as to how peoples lives have been
adversely affected by similar land use controls.
The Blodgett & Lehmann Amicus Brief
The amicus brief filed by Wells H. Blodgett and Frederick W. Lehmann was submitted
because "they are counsel in a case of essentially the same nature, pending in the Eastern Division of
the Eastern District of Missouri. The city of St. Louis has enacted two so-called segregation
ordinances inspired by and patterned after that of the city of Louisville, which is assailed as
unconstitutional in the case at bar." 73 This amicus brief is more emotive than the petitioner brief,
and follows the NAACP brief in asking the court to consider many societal issues implicit in the
equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The authors write:
In virtue of its police power, the State may protect its people against neighbors who are
conducting immoral vocations; it may segregate as between public and quasi-public
structures and those devoted to purely private uses; and it may assign the factory to one
quarter and the home to another. But when it has done all this, may it go farther and
enforce segregation between the homes of people who are moral and law abiding, because of
difference in social condition? May it segregate as between white men, natural born citizens
and naturalized citizens? Or is this sort of segregation applicable only to the negro?74
The brief discusses relevant case law concerning marriages and education, and bases some of their
views on Plessy v. Ferguson75, the "separate, but equal" case involving accommodations on trains. In
regard to this case, and in light of the case at hand, the authors write, "we are not dealing here with a
day's ride for which equal conveniences are provided, but with the acquisition of a home, the
concern of a lifetime." 76
This brief eloquently states the rights of all people in the United States, drawing from the
writings of Abraham Lincoln and the author's belief in individual freedom unrestricted by laws that
attempt to segregate races to create a subordinate class of people. This brief not only provides the
court with information on the impact of the St. Louis zoning ordinance on the residents of that city,
73 Amicus brief of Wells H. Blodgett and Frederick W. Lehmann, p. 2
74 Amicus brief of Wells H. Blodgett and Frederick W. Lehmann, p. 7
75 163 U.S. 537
76 Amicus brief of Wells H. Blodgett and Frederick W. Lehmann, p. 16
but it utilizes the flexible nature of the amicus brief to describe for the court how these ordinances
can be viewed in a democratic society. The brief addresses relevant case law and questions of the
constitutionality of these ordinances, but the strength of the brief lies in the author's conviction that
these types of land use controls are fundamentally wrong. This brief allows the court a broad
perspective of the issues that reach beyond the questions directly presented in this case.
Perhaps most importantly, these briefs added a new perspective to this case, as the case was
considered on the grounds that the plaintiff's constitutional rights, as a white landowner, had been
violated. These briefs drew in the perspective of the rights of the African-American in this case,
which would otherwise have not been a part of the record.
Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp.77
The facts of this case as reported in 429 U.S. 252 are as follows: In 1971 respondent
Metropolitan Housing Development Corporation ("MHDC") applied to petitioner, the Village of
Arlington Heights, Illinois, for the rezoning of a 15-acre parcel from single-family to multiple-family
classification. Using federal financial assistance, MHDC planned to build 190 clustered townhouse
units for low and moderate-income tenants. The Village denied the rezoning request.
The original complaint "alleged that the refusal to rezone made housing unavailable because
of race, perpetuated segregation, and denied MHDC the right to use its property in a reasonable
manner in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Fair Housing Act of 196878, the Civil Rights
Act of 186679, and the Civil Rights Act of 187180."
The 15-acre site leased by MHDC from the Clerics of St. Viator, was to be developed as
"Lincoln Green." This plan met the density per acre requirements of the R-5 zone designation
sought by the MHDC, but due to federal funding of the project, could only be constructed if the R-5
zone permitted multiple family occupancy. This permission in an R-5 zone was not clearly spelled
out in the zoning ordinance of the Village.
The Supreme Court ruled that official action, such as the zoning ordinance, will not be held
unconstitutional solely because it results in racially disproportionate impact; proof of racially
discriminatory intent or purpose is required to show violation of the Equal Protection Clause.
Therefore, a consistent pattern of official racial discrimination was not necessary predicate to
violation of Equal Protection Clause. While the court found that the MHDC had standing in this
77 517 F. 2d 409 (C.A. 7 1975), cert. Granted 44 U.S.L.W. 3358 (12/16/75).
78 42 U.S.C. Section 3601
79 42 U.S.C.A. Section 1982
80 42 U.S.C. Section 1983
case, they held that the MHDC failed to discharge their burden of proving that the Village's rezoning
decision was racially motivated. The Supreme Court 1 reversed and remanded the case at bar.
The Amicus Briefs
There were two briefs filed by anici in support of the MHDC at the Supreme Court level.
One brief was sponsored by the League of Women Voters of the United States ("League"), Illinois,
Cook County and Arlington Heights-Mt. Prospect area; the American Jewish Committee ("AJC"),
the Arlington Heights Clergy Fellowship and the Minority Industrial Relations Council, Inc.
("MIRC"). The second brief was filed by the American Society of Planning Officials ("ASPO").
The League Amicus Brief
The amicus brief of the League and others was filed because "the amici believe that an
amicus brief on their behalf (MHDC) will help to demonstrate the relationship between the issues in
this court and the nationwide problem of metropolitan area housing segregation." 82 This amicus
brief brought together a variety of national and local interests to support the MHDC. The AJC and
the League, whose combined membership totaled 200,000 people in 1975, had had a long history of
pursuing equal rights throughout the U.S. They presented research and studies that linked the impact
of exclusionary land use practices to inequities in housing, education, and employment.83
The Cook County League, Arlington Heights Clergy Fellowship, and MIRC produced local
views of the barriers created by land use controls in the suburbs of Chicago. The MIRC is directly
impacted by policies that restrict construction of low-cost homes for minorities because Federal law
requires the companies that make up this organization to maintain affirmative action hiring goals.
For these reasons, the amici promoted their relevant interest in the case at bar, a requirement that is
often necessary to gain approval for a motion for leave to file an amicus brief.
This brief focuses on developing the idea of the causal relationship between suburban
exclusionary zoning practices and metropolitan residential patterns. The stance of the amici is
summarized in one portion of their brief, which reads:
The restrictive practices of Arlington Heights and similar suburbs consign Chicago to
becoming progressively a ghetto area for blacks and minorities. The whites flee to the
suburbs and build an effective wall which serves to exclude minorities from their own
community and to confine them to the City of Chicago. 84
81 423 U.S. 1030, 429 U.S. 252
82 Brief for the League of Women Voters, p.A2
83 Brief for the League of Women Voters, p.A2
84 Brief for the League of Women Voters, p.11
The strength of this brief rests in the fact that the views of the MHDC are thereby supported by a
variety of interests, but aside from the few comments reported here, the brief is almost an exact
replica of the respondent brief, providing little additional significant information to the Court. If
nothing else, this brief provides the Court with the knowledge that these groups favor the opinion of
the Court of Appeals and express to the Court that the amici are interested in the outcome of cases
such as the one at hand.
The ASPO Amicus Brief
The second amicus brief in this case was filed by the American Society of Planning Officials
("ASPO"). ASPO is a "national membership association serving governmental planning agencies
and local municipal officials as the national clearinghouse for planning information, and identifies
and analyzes important trends in the planning field." 85 The main platform of these amici is the idea
that racial discrimination issues that are likely to come before the court will not always involve open
discrimination that is unconstitutional on its face, 86 thereby bringing into question the discriminatory
intent requirement established by the Court.
The brief discusses the ways in which racial minorities are often adversely affected by zoning
policies that were written with the general welfare of all people in mind, not with any discriminatory
intent. They developed the idea that the purpose of the ordinance may well be legitimate, but the
result has been to unequally impact low-income people. The brief promotes the idea that the Equal
Protection Clause of the 14t Amendment is difficult to invoke, as the "motivation or intent" of the
zoning ordinance is hard to ascertain, and the effect of segregation that may develop from such
ordinances is not necessarily unconstitutional.
This brief provided the Court with information concerning how land use development
decisions work in a democratic system of public notice and comment periods and open meetings
held when questions of zoning arise. While the brief develops ideas touched upon in the respondent
brief, the language used by the amicus has a stronger tone of disapproval for the ordinance impacting
the MHDC. The amicus state that they agree that "for the most part petitioners (the Village) have
set out a proper picture of the usual zoning review situation. However, this is not a usual zoning
case."
87
The brief calls on the Court to use the "compelling interest" 88 test, which requires strict
scrutiny, in determining the Village's refusal to rezone the parcel. The amicus state that,
85 Brief for the ASPO, p.2
86 Paraphrase of the Brief for ASPO, p.2
87 Brief for the ASPO, p. 18
88 Black's Law Dictionary defines "compelling state interest test" as "In constitutional law, a method for
determining the validity of a law that seems to encroach on constitutional rights, whereby the government's
"communities are not being asked to provide housing for anyone or to discard all existing regulations
in deference to low income integrated housing. A proposal to build upon a flood plain, or where
public facilities such as sewer and water were not yet available could be validly rejected under the
compelling interest test."89
Both of the amicus briefs filed in the Arlington Heights case focused primarily on the legal
issues at hand, relevant case law, and the planning process of developing comprehensive plans. They
both stated that the refusal to rezone the property in question aided in a segregated Chicago
metropolitan areas, pulling this evidence from statistical and land use studies.
The briefs developed the idea that the Lincoln Green proposal was partially spurred by the
loss of jobs in Chicago to the northern suburbs like Arlington Heights. Lack of public transportation
to this suburb and the lengthy commute by car made it difficult for minorities to remain employed at
a firm after it relocated. Because there were no low-and moderate-income housing options in
Arlington Heights, Lincoln Green would be the first opportunity for minorities to find jobs and
residences in the same area.
The ASPO brief further challenges the discriminatory intent standard established in
Washington v. Davis, urging the Court to consider the economic issues as suspect classifications; not
just the racial issue. This brief points to the root of many exclusionary zoning cases, that race and
economic class are strongly linked. The brief also urges on the court the concept that an ordinance
that is not modified to meet the needs of all people to integrate into new areas should be held invalid.
City of Cleburne, Texas et.al v. Cleburne Living Cente9
I chose to include this case focusing on excluding a group home for the mentally retarded
for several reasons. It was stated in this case that without such homes "the retarded could never
hope to integrate themselves into the community" 91 and that this group of citizens was often
discriminated against because of general lack of understanding concerning the term "mentally
retarded". This case, like the other cases discussed in this thesis, represents the question of how we
consider the equal right to housing opportunities for society as a whole. As the brief for the state of
Maryland as amicus curiae states, "the interest of mentally retarded persons is tantamount to an
interest in liberty, for without group homes in the community the only alternatives for most is
institutionalization." 92
interest in the law is balanced against the individual's constitutional right to be free of the law, and only if the
government's interest is strong enough will the law be upheld; the compelling-state-interest test is used more
commonly in equal-protections analysis when the disputed law requires strict scrutiny.
89 Brief for ASPO, p. 22
90 473 U.S. 432; 105 S.Ct. 3249; 1985 U.S. Lexis 118; 87 L. Ed. 2d. 313, 53 U.S.L.W. 5022
91 473 U.S. at 439
92 Amicus brief for State of Maryland, p. 5
This case was heard before the U.S. Supreme Court, March 18, 1985. The facts of the case
are as follows: In July 1980, respondent Jan Hannah purchased a building at 201 Featherston Street
in the city of Cleburne, Texas, with the intent of leasing it to the Cleburne Living Center, Inc.,
("CLC") for the operation of a group home for the mentally retarded. The home would be the
residence of 13 mentally retarded adults who would receive constant supervision. The site of the
home was zoned "R-3" or an "Apartment House District". Section 8 of the Cleburne zoning
ordinance allows "hospitals, sanitariums, nursing homes or homes for convalescents or aged, other
than for the insane or feeble-minded or alcoholics or drug addicts" as permitted uses in the R-3 zone.
The City declared the group home in question a "hospital for the feeble-minded," which required a
special use permit for the site. The City of Cleburne, after a public hearing, denied the special use
permit. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeals, holding that the zoning
ordinance was invalid as applied to the Featherston home.
Amicus Citation in the Written Decision
Justice White delivered the opinion of the court on this case, and maintained that "how this
large and diversified group is to be treated under the law is a difficult and technical matter, very much
a task for legislators guided by qualified professionals and not by the perhaps ill-formed opinions of
the judiciary." 93 White looked for technical assistance in the amicus brief filed on behalf of the
American Association on Mental Deficiency ("AAMD"), as was cited in the written opinion of this
case. This brief defined the degrees of persons with mental retardation, explaining that only people
with "mild" or "moderate" retardation typically lived in group homes. The brief provided the
concept that "mild" retardation was often difficult to detect from casual encounters. The AAMD
amicus brief may therefore have influenced the court's interpretation of the City's claim that the
denial of the special permit was based in part on protecting this group from potential harassment
because they would stand out.
The Amicus Briefs
The City of Cleburne case is one in which the amici and the respondent party appeared to
work together, at least to some extent, to develop a strong case. Counsel for the respondent cite the
amici briefs within their own brief to draw the court's attention to certain important points that are
touched upon in the party brief, but are illustrated at length in the amici briefs. This case is an
example of a state filing a brief to inform the court of the role of the city as a political subdivision of
the state designated to carry out the public policy of the state.
93 473 U.S. at 443
Three amicus curiae briefs were considered for this case. 94 They represent the collective
viewpoints of the Attorney Generals from twelve states, and the Texas Department of Mental Health
and Mental Retardation ("TDMHMR").
The TDMHMR Amicus Brief
The TDMHMR was created by the state of Texas as an agency authorized to implement
public policy pertaining to the mentally retarded under the Texas Mental Health and Mental
Retardation Act of 1965.95 That public policy mandates a preference for normalized community-
based living alternatives for the mentally retarded. This policy can be underminded by a local
government entity exercising its zoning powers so as to exclude State-authorized group homes from
normal residential neighborhoods. 96
This brief explains to the court that the authority to determine how to meet the needs of the
mentally retarded in terms of community-based group homes is a power granted by the State to the
TDMHMR and not to local zoning authorities. The amicus, represented by the Attorney General for
the State of Texas, goes on to ask the court to consider this case on the more narrow grounds that
the contested City zoning ordinance does not rationally serve any governmental purpose, and
furthermore that the ordinance expressly goes against the basic Bill of Rights outlined in the MHMR
Act.97
The strength of this brief lies in explaining to the court the general policies of the State to
allow mentally retarded people the "same rights and responsibilities enjoyed by all citizens of Texas",
and the desire by the State for the court to uphold the public policies that make community living
possible.
This brief condemns the ordinance of the City, stating that this use of zoning to exclude
certain uses, and therefore people, is not a valid function of the City through its delegated zoning
powers, as the ordinance cannot be found to rationally serve a State interest. 98 The State approves of
the 13-bed group home, and informs the court that if the State chooses to permit this home, the City
has no authority to second guess the discretionary judgment through its zoning powers.99 The
Attorney General implies that if the City's ordinance is found to be valid in this case it may be
challenged by the State at a later time.
94 The amicus brief of the Attorney Generals of PA,IA,MI,MN,NH,NJ,OH, and WI restated the views of the
other amici, so it will not be referred to at length. The amicus brief filed by the Solicitor General for the
United States will also not be discussed. This brief focused on the subject of whether the classifications drawn
on the basis of mental retardation are subject to heightened judicial scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause.
9s Amicus Brief for the State of Texas, p.1
96 Amicus Brief for the State of Texas, p.1
97 Amicus brief for the State of Texas, p. 4
98 Amicus brief for the State of Texas, p. 10
This brief provides the court with a strong message of their support for the work of the
CLC in furthering the public policies of the State, and helps the court understand the interest of the
State in cases such as the one at bar. It addresses the issue of a narrow holding and the specific
grounds by which this case should be considered.
The Attorney General for the State of Connecticut Amicus Brief
The second brief in this case was filed by the state of Connecticut, and was joined by the
states of Arkansas, California, Colorado, Illinois, Louisiana, North Dakota, Rhode Island, Tennessee,
and West Virginia. The brief was written by the Attorney General for the state of Connecticut and
supported by the Attorney Generals from the respective states. This brief was written to inform the
court that these states are committed to reforming past wrongs that have isolated mentally retarded
people rather than integrating them into society. Amici States contend that exclusionary zoning
which is directed against mentally retarded people as such should be prohibited as a matter of
constitutional principle.100 The brief follows the lead of the State of Texas in its attempt to explain to
the court that the interest of the State on the matter of group homes for the mentally retarded can
not be furthered under ordinances such as the one at bar.
The amici draw from many studies to provide the court with information on how public
perception of the mentally retarded has changed over time. This is particularly important in the case
at bar, as the City claimed that one reason for denying the permit was opposition from neighbors.
The amici list surveys showing that neighbors of other group homes in various cities also were
reported to have had fears of persons with mental retardation before a group home was opened, but
that this fears subsided after residents in the community noticed no behavioral problems from the
residents of the group home.
Finally, the amici support the brief of the respondent and the other amici in stating that
failure to develop this opportunity for housing for mentally retarded people exacerbates "their
residential political powerlessness" and maintains a society where these people are a 'discrete and
insular' minority."101
The Attorney General for the State of Maryland Amicus Brief
The third brief, for the State of Maryland was filed because "group homes for the mentally
retarded are essential to the realization of the State's goals." 102 The Attorney General for the State of
Maryland wrote the brief in an effort to inform the court of the dire need for communities to host
99 Amicus brief for the State of Texas, p. 11
100 Amicus brief for the State of CT et al. p. 2
101 Amicus brief for the State of CT et al. p.5
group homes as more states (including Maryland) close institutional facilities for persons with mental
retardation in favor of "small community living arrangements. The Attorney General informed the
court that the zoning ordinance at bar is "unconstitutional as it does not relate to any legitimate
zoning purpose and, in fact, is based on unfounded and unacceptable prejudices."103 The amicus
explains that validating zoning ordinances of this sort that specifically exclude persons with mental
retardation from living in group homes could make it difficult for the State of Maryland to realize
their own needs for such facilities.
The amicus draws the court's attention to the fact that the City's zoning ordinance was
"enacted 20 years ago at a time when mentally retarded people were locked away in large isolated
institutions" and that the ordinance's exclusion of "hospitals" for the "feeble-minded" reflects the
mistaken preconceptions of that time.104 This brief is perhaps the most passionate of the amici as it
explains that the case at hand is important because it addresses the fact that the interest of persons
with mental retardation is essential to an interest in liberty.105 The amicus asks the court to consider
the degree to which the City's authority to zone a parcel restrains these historically "politically
powerless" people from their right to benefit from the quality of community life which is extended,
with the exception of recovering drug addicts, to all other current and future residents of Clerburne.
The Attorney Generals for the twelve States provide the court with detailed information as
to how the holding in this case will directly impact the ability of the States to fulfill their public policy
goals of integrating persons with mental retardation into normal community life. They also state that
if the court rules in favor of the City it would be difficult for these States to challenge similar zoning
ordinances in their respective cities in the future. The use of this legal tool presented the court with
current definitions of "mental retardation", provided evidence that group homes were essential in
other States, and explained the various ways in which the ordinance did not support a valid
governmental interest.
Wayne Britton v. Town of Cheste' 06
The facts of this case, heard in 1991, are as follows: the Town of Chester, New Hampshire
lies in the west-central portion of Rockingham County, thirteen miles east of the city of Manchester.
The available housing stock is principally single-family homes. Because of its close proximity to job
102 Amicus brief for the State of MD et al. p.1
103 Amicus brief for the State of MD, p.2
104 Amicus brief for the State of MD, p.4
105 Amicus brief for the State of MD, p.5
106 134 N.H. 434, 595 A.2d 492 (1991)
centers and the ready availability of vacant land, the town is projected to have among the highest
growth rate in New Hampshire over the next two decades. 107
The plaintiffs in this case are a group of low-and moderate-income people who have been
unsuccessful in finding affordable, adequate housing in Chester. They were joined by a builder who
is committed to the construction of such housing. 108 The plaintiffs brought a petition in 1985, for
declaratory and injunctive relief, challenging the validity of the multi-family housing provisions of the
Chester Zoning Ordinance. 109
The zoning ordinance in effect at the beginning of this action in 1985 provided for a single-
family home on a two-acre lot or a duplex on a three-acre lot, and it excluded multi-family housing
from all five zoning districts in the town. In July 1986, the town amended its zoning ordinance to
allow multi-family housing. Article Six of the amended ordinance permits multi-family housing as
part of a "planned residential development" (PRD), a form of multi-family housing required to
include a variety of housing types, such as single-family homes, duplexes, and multi-family
structures. 10
A special master, appointed by the court at the trial court level, evaluated the zoning
ordinance. The master concluded that on its face, the ordinance permitted the type of development
that the plaintiffs argue was being prohibited. The master found, however, that the ordinance placed
an unreasonable barrier to the development of affordable housing for low-and moderate-income
families. Under the ordinance, PRDs are allowed on tracts of not less than twenty acres in two
designated "R-2" (medium-density residential) zoning districts. Due to existing home construction
and environmental considerations, such as wetlands and steep slopes, only slightly more than half of
all the land in the two R-2 districts could reasonably be used for multi-family development."
The Supreme Court of New Hampshire held that the ordinance's restrictions on multifamily housing
ran afoul of statutory requirements that an ordinance promote the general welfare of the community.
In the concluding words of the court, the majority held that the zoning ordinance (in general)
evolved as an innovative means to counter the problems of uncontrolled growth, and that the town
of Chester had adopted a zoning ordinance which was blatantly exclusionary.11 2
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The Amicus Briefs
On appeal from the Rockingham Superior Court, the Home Builders Association of New
Hampshire, the New Hampshire Housing Finance Authority, and the American Planning
Association ("APA") filed amici curiae briefs in this case. In summary, the amici representing
agencies of the state of New Hampshire provided the court with information about the need for
housing and the state's interest in supporting housing opportunities. These briefs are not considered
further in this case.
The APA Amicus Brief
The APA brief was co-authored by Brian W. Blaesser, Susan M. Conner, Eric Damian Kelly,
Stuart Meck, John M. Payne, James M. Rubenstein, Charles F. Tucker, and Norman Williams Jr. As
Susan Conner pointed out in an interview concerning this brief, "the strength of this particular brief
was based on two facts. The first fact was that the parties in the case were only arguing New
Hampshire law, this brief served to fill in the substantive gaps to allow a broader perspective on
exclusionary zoning in other states. The second fact is that the brief represents the viewpoints of
some of the preeminent land use lawyers and planning scholars in the U.S., which brought a certain
expertise and reputation to the issues before the court."1 3
The APA requested permission to file an amicus brief before the court because the
organization "has developed a special research expertise in the relationship of sound land use
planning to the availability of low and moderate-income housing. In 1986, APA's Board of Directors
specially directed that it take legislative and legal action in state courts to establish and enforce fair
share housing and land use programs at the state and local levels."11 4 This brief provides evidence of
national land use studies describing the political dynamics of exclusionary zoning that erects barriers
to developers or potential residents of affordable housing. This brief attempts to:
Assist the court in rethinking the proper nature of a remedy for exclusionary zoning, a
remedy that, with appropriate constitutional guidance, can be implemented by the NH
legislature and serve as a model for the many states with similar problems.11 5
Exclusionary zoning cases in New Hampshire were not new to the court 116, but the Supreme Court
had not settled the issue of regional general welfare in the state, and had not looked at the Town of
Chester specifically. This brief explains the concept and application of regional general welfare in
terms of the states that adopted such guidelines in the past.
113 Interview with Susan Conner, January 10, 1999.
"
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The brief discussed the regional setting, planning context and regulatory framework of the
Town of Chester and detail the development of anti-exclusionary zoning rules in other states to show
that a zoning ordinance can strongly influence the supply and distribution of housing over a
region.11 7 The authors situate the ordinance at bar in the history of planning and zoning developed
under the Standard Planning and Zoning Enabling Acts to show the court that it is often up to the
judiciary to decide these difficult matters because "the Standard Acts were process oriented,
concentrating on the mechanics of making decisions rather than the substantive content of those
decisions."s18 This discussion may have influenced the court's decision to rely on the substance of
the statutory requirements of the zoning ordinance rather than reaching a holding on constitutional
grounds.
The brief provided the courts with studies and case law developed in other states in order to
point to the need for judicial intervention if the exclusionary zoning problem is to be solved.' 19 The
studies describe the difficulties of affordable housing advocates to build coalitions to have their
voices heard, and the politics of metropolitan housing concerns. These pieces can help the court
understand how local land use decisions have been made, and why they should be reconsidered to
reflect the realities of sprawl and increased populations in urban areas.
The case law presented in this amicus brief also describes how certain state courts have
rejected the Supreme Court models developed in Warth v. Seldin and Metropolitan Housing Development
Co. v. Village ofArlington Heights as too restrictive in light of how cities have changed. The brief uses
the words of Justice Hall in Mount Laurel I, to explain the idea that "zoning should be for the living
welfare of the people, not for abstractions such as building types."120
In providing an analysis of anti-exclusionary zoning law of the 1970s and 1980s. The amici
conclude:
The consideration involved in such analysis are similar to those involved in equal protection
cases. The underlying basic principles are the same: if a governmental body decides to use
public regulations such as planning and zoning, it must employ them on behalf of the
welfare of all sectors of the population.121 The state courts, however, true to their long
tradition of keeping tight control over land use law, have phrased the leading decisions in the
framework of "regional general welfare" rather than equal protection. By doing so, the
general proposition in American law on police power regulation of private activity-that to be
116 see Beck v. Town of Raymond, 118 NH 793, 394 A 2d. 847 (1978), Stoney-Brook Development Corp. v. Town of
Freemont, 124 NH 583, 474 A 2d. 561 (1984), Soares v. Town ofAtkinson, 128 NH 350, 512 A 2d 436 (1986),
appeal after remand, 129 NH 313, 529 A 2d 867 (1987).
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121 See Southern Alameda County Spanish Speaking Org. v. City of Union City, 424 F.2d 291, 295-96 (9th Cir. 1970);
Kennedy Park Homes Ass'n v. City ofLackawanna, 318 F. Supp. 669, 696-97 (W.D.N.Y.), afd, 436 F. 2d 108 (2d
Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1010 (1971).
valid, such restrictions most promote the public health, safety and general welfare- has been
transformed to impose responsibilities on towns as well as to give them more power. 122
The position of the APA throughout the brief suggests to the judiciary that they should become
actively involved in enforcing the statutory provisions of the zoning enabling act in the towns and
cities of New Hampshire. These areas should comply with the statutory commitment of promoting
the general welfare by making low-cost housing opportunities a reality. This brief provides the court
with extensive rationale for a holding that does not completely invalidate the ordinance, but rather
remands the case to the trial court for consideration of the remedies outlined in the brief.
This is an example of the ways in which an amicus brief can provide information to the
court by individuals who have experience in, and have studied aspects of, matters clearly related to
the case at hand. While the brief clearly supports the plaintiff's challenge to the city, it offers the
court insight into the politics of the planning and zoning process that may assist the judges in
determining their role in deciding the legislative function. Because the courts have traditionally given
deference to the municipality, this brief illustrates how the intervention of the judiciary in the case at
bar may serve to enforce anti-exclusionary policy and provide the court with greater guidance if
similar cases arise in the future. This document is an example of the pursuit of policies through the
filing of an amicus briefs.
Conclusions from the Briefs
The amicus briefs in these cases support the claim that such briefs can be a useful tool for
environmental justice advocates in lieu of direct litigation. These briefs can communicate ideas that
might otherwise not be addressed in litigation. This chapter illustrates that land use cases involving
the legitimacy of zoning ordinances have many layers and interests. Such intricacies may be difficult
for judges to draw out from the facts presented by the parties to the lawsuit.
The gaps in party briefs can be filled by amicus briefs that transcend the arguments
developed by the litigants. The amicus brief can provide additional definitions, studies, and expertise,
and address the important issues of individual freedom and liberty that places these cases in the
broad societal framework from which they originally developed. The amici play a significant role in
these particular cases by drawing attention to the "lessons learned" from planning and zoning
techniques throughout America. The utility of these particular briefs was examined in light of the
three questions for effective advocacy posed by Cole (1992) and quoted at the end of Chapter Two,
(see above) the literature on what makes an effective amicus brief, and the work of Paul Smith.
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Paul Smith123 cites four different approaches that may produce useful amicus briefs. The strategy
for using one of these models over another depends on the specific case, and in some cases it may be
best to utilize parts of several of these ideas. These approaches are:
1. A Brief that Makes the Main Legal Argument. In some cases, depending on who is
representing the party whom the amicus is supporting and on the quality of the legal
arguments the party is likely to present, it is essential to devote most of the amicus brief to
an improved version of the main legal argument.
2. A Brief that Makes an Alternative Legal Argument. Occasionally, it makes sense for an
amicus to offer a legal argument that is entirely different from the one presented by the
party. Sometimes, counsel for amici will conclude that the party is not putting its best legal
foot forward. In other cases, differences between the interests of the party and the amicus
will prompt the amicus to try to modify the court's legal analysis to favor the distinctive
interests of the amicus. Of course, it makes no sense to present an argument when the case
is in a procedural posture that would prevent the court from adopting it. But that often is
not a problem, especially when an amicus is supporting an appellee.
3. A Brief that Emphasizes the Practical Impact of a Particular Legal Rule. Often, amicus
briefs usefully describe for the court other pending litigation that will be affected by the
outcome of the appeal. This can include one case in which the amicus is involved or an
entire category of cases pending in many courts. Such descriptions can influence courts by
informing then about the breadth of the impact of their decision, as well as possible
variations among the cases that may require refinement of the legal analysis.
4. A Brief that Provides Factual Information Relevant to the Resolution of a Legal Issue. As
noted, many amicus briefs focus on descriptions of research or other factual matieral that
informs the court about the "real world". Almost always, such statements of facts are
supported by citations to published nonlegal authorities (Smith 1998, 4).
Each of the amicus briefs filed in these cases reflects some aspect of these various approaches.
The amici in the Buchanan case draw out a different perspective focusing on the rights of the
African American buyer, rather than the property rights of the white seller. In so doing, they
propose an alternative argument based on the Fourteenth Amendment that addresses the root of the
problem at hand, rather than a narrow view of the issues before the court. The Blodgett & Lehmann
amicus brief emphasizes the practical impact of a particular legal rule by explaining to the court that
they are involved in a similar case in their state, therefore the ruling of the court could impact their
ability to further their efforts to invalidate the zoning ordinance that segregates their city.
The amici in the Arlington case provided factual information to the court in the form of
studies, and developed the idea that the zoning ordinance in question had implications beyond the
boundaries of the village. The ASPO amicus brief provided an alternative legal argument, and
addressed the issues of discrimination that can result from an ordinance, whether intentional or not.
123 Attorney for the law firm of Jenner & Block
By analyzing this case in terms of their own policy positions on land use and housing, they informed
the court how a narrow ruling on this case would directly impact the interests of their organization.
The idea of using these briefs to inform the court of the public policy interests of third
parties is also seen in the amicus brief of the TDMHMR in the Clerburne case. This brief does not
present an alternative legal argument, so much as it presents an alternative understanding of the local
police power of zoning. This brief provides factual information to the court by describing the
various mechanisms in place in the state of Texas to integrate persons with mental retardation into
various communities.
The Attorney General briefs provide the court with factual information pertaining to the
legitimate governmental interests of these states to "right past wrongs" through policy initiatives to
provide equal housing opportunities to mentally retarded people. These briefs explain to the court
how a ruling for the City will negatively impact the policies of the respective states by setting a
precedent that goes against their efforts. They address the root of the societal problem to exclude
people with mental retardation, and provide evidence that integrating these people in their
neighborhoods has been successful. The esteem of the authors filing these briefs on behalf of the
liberty of the people that would be excluded informs the court that there is a large, well informed
audience in cases such as the one at bar.
The brief for the APA provides significant factual information to the court, and presents an
alternative argument focusing on the statutory, rather than the constitutional, aspects of the Britton
case. Although it is unclear from the written decision that the court's approach in this case was
guided by the APA brief, the final ruling on statutory grounds was a departure from the way courts
had examined exclusionary zoning cases in the past.
Exportable Lessons
There are several lessons that can be learned from these briefs that can be exported to
support the use of this legal tool in the environmental justice movement. First, these briefs provide
outlets for organizations to express their policy interests in terms of the potential outcomes of a
specific case. While grassroots organizations may not have specific policies per se, these groups have
specific principles that can be affected by the rulings in a case. These groups can support their
legitimate interest in these cases before the court by explaining how the furthering of their beliefs will
be impacted by the outcome of the case in question.
Second, the amici in these exclusionary zoning cases generally present different perspectives
than those developed by the parties directly involved. Community groups have local expertise and
unique experiences that can only come from living in neighborhoods. The perceived impacts to
the health and safety of the people in a neighborhood polluted and contaminated by industrial or
hazardous use may support the claim that any additional facilities will only cause the situation to
worsen. This may help the court understand the broader implications that one additional facility,
which appears innocuous, will have on the community.
Third, the amicus briefs have been shown to be able to fill gaps in the technical or legal
arguments presented in a case. Because risk assessments and environmental regulations do not take
cumulative effects into account, the technical information provided in a case might not address the
distributional hazards associated with certain industrial land uses. Stories of community organizing,
and personal experience, has shown that community groups often conduct neighborhood surveys to
compile data on residents' perceptions of the hazards in their environment. In some cases,
individuals in a community have recorded the time and date associated with noxious fumes, an
exacerbation of asthma, burning eyes, and other health problems. These records are often kept to
compare observations with others in the community to connect the problems and the particular
industrial processes. These records could be useful in filling a gap in a party's claim that only
addresses issues of aggregate pollution. This information could be helpful in explaining why these
claims are pursued in the name of justice.
Finally, the amicus briefs in the four exclusionary zoning cases provided alternative
interpretations of the legal arguments presented in these cases. The use of alternative interpretations
can support the rationale for using relative standards to judge land use controls in terms of societal
changes since an ordinance was drafted. Several of the briefs explain archaic prejudices and fears
that still influence land use restrictions. Environmental justice advocates filing amicus briefs might
address similar issues of unfounded prejudice that have impacted their civil rights, and explain how
true democracy is furthered by efforts to change discriminatory trends. The use of amicus briefs by
environmental justice advocates is one way in which groups can participate in legal decisions that
could in turn impact their quality of life.
The final chapter of this thesis illustrates the points discussed in this chapter in terms of an
environmental justice case, and the issues that might be expressed in an accompanying amicus brief.
Chapter Five: Outlining the Points ofan Amicus Brief:
The South Bronx Coalidon for Clean Air, Inc. v. Conroy,2 4 20 F.Supp.2d 565 (Sept. 8, 1998)
This chapter examines an environmental justice case to describe how environmental justice
activists could draft an amicus brief in the case. The case, The South Bronx Coalitionfor Clean Air, Inc. v.
Conroy125 was heard before the United States District Court, S.D. New York in 1998. The plaintiffs,
supported by the New York City Environmental Justice Alliance, Inc., lost the case for a variety of
reasons. Two of these reasons, the failure to make prima facie126 showing of disparate impact, and
allegations found to be conclusory127 because they lacked detailed information in the complaint, are
important to consider in terms of how an amicus brief could be drafted. These "failures" represent
gaps in the complaint that could have been filled by an amicus brief. It is impossible to know how
the court would have ruled given amicus participation in this case, however, it is safe to speculate,
given the holding of the court, that the case for the plaintiff might have been stronger had additional
information been provided to the court. The points made by potential amici are italicized.
The Background of the Caseu8 :
The Harlem River Yard
This case arises out of a plan to develop the Harlem River Yard ("the Yard"), a 96-acre
facility located in the South Bronx in New York City. The Yard formerly served as a rail yard for the
New Haven Railroad, but fell into disuse following the merger of the New Haven and Penn Central
railroads in 1972. In 1991, the New York State Department of Transportation ("DOT"), leased the
Yard to defendant Harlem River Yard Ventures ("HRYV"), a private developer, for development of
a multi-use industrial facility. In 1993, HRYV submitted a final land use plan to the DOT for
development of the Yard that provided for, among other things, an intermodal freight terminal
124 The plaintiff group in this case included: The South Bronx Clean Air Coalition, Business Labor and
Community Coalition, Inc., Urban Alliance, Inc., Cherry Tree Association, Inc. and New York City
Environmental Justice Alliance. The defendant group included: E. Virgil Conroy as Chairman and President
of the Metropolitan Transit Authority and of the New York City Transit Authority and Manhattan Bronx
Surface Transit Operating Authority, and of the Long Island Railroad, Hon. George Pataki, as Governor of the
State of New York, Joseph H. Boardman as Commissioner of the New York State Department of
Transportation, the New York State Urban Development Corp., John Cahill as Commissioner, New York State
Department of Environmental Conservation, Hon. Carol M. Browner as administrator of the United States
Environmental Protection Agency, Hon. Rodney Slater as United States Secretary of Transportation, Harlem
River Yard Ventures, Inc., the New York Post Company, Inc., and USA Waste, Inc.
125 20 F.Supp. 2d 565
126 Black's Law Dictionary defines prima facie ("at first sight") as, "on its face; apparently. True or valid on first
impression; evident without proof.
127 Black's Law Dictionary defines "conclusory" as: "expressing a factual inference without stating the
underlying facts on which the inference is based <the plaintiffs allegations were merely conclusory and lacked
any supporting evidence>."
128 Some of the facts of this case are taken directly from 20 F.Supp 2d 565
comprising of 28 acres, a 3,000 ton per day truck-to-rail solid waste transfer facility on five acres, a
paper recycling plant and substantial warehousing. The plan was the subject of a Final
Environmental Impact Statement ("FEIS") prepared by an outside environmental consultant for
HRYV that was submitted to the DOT in December 1993, and approved May 1994. The FEIS
concluded that trucks and other sources of air emissions associated with all the uses set forth in
HRYV's land use plan would not have any significant adverse effect on air quality in the Bronx.
On September 15, 1997, the New York State Department of Conservation ("DEC") issued
defendant USA Waste a permit to construct and operate a 3,000 ton per day solid waste transfer
station to be located within the Harlem River Yard site. In conjunction with the issuance of the
permit, DEC issued a "Findings Statement" concluding that although the overall "footprint area" of
the USA Waste facility would be larger than contemplated by the 1993 FEIS, this difference would
"cnot result in significant adverse environmental impacts, and will have some additional benefits." 129
The Walnut Depot
Located adjacent to the Yard is the Walnut Depot, a two-story, 338,000 square foot building. The
building was originally constructed as a warehouse in 1931. In 1981, the Federal Transit
Administration ("FTA"), provided the New York City Transit Authority ("NYCTA") with $13
million dollars to convert the property into a bus garage, material storage facility and bus training
school. The Manhattan Transit Authority ("MTA") no longer receives any federal funding and was
depleted of its last federal operating funds in 1997. MTA has already determined that the Walnut
Depot was functionally and operationally obsolete as a bus depot and had decided to replace it by
reconstructing the Coliseum Bus Depot in a different section of the Bronx. The Walnut Depot site
has been subleased to the New York Post to develop a new color printing press. A full
Environmental Assessment Form ("EAF") was prepared by an environmental consultant, and
concluded that the use of part of the Walnut Depot site for a printing press would have no
significant environmental impact beyond those that had been examined in the 1993 FEIS.
The plaintiffs claim that the events connected with the sale of the Walnut Depot property
will have deleterious effects in the South Bronx. Specifically, they claim that the re-routing of buses
from the Walnut Depot to the Coliseum Depot will result in 1,800 extra bus miles traveled per
weekday, generating more pollution in the South Bronx. The plaintiffs also claim that the expansion
of the USA Waste waste transfer facility, will create a situation in which minority residents in the
South Bronx are more subject to the noxious effects of garbage than the mostly white residents of
Long Island. Plaintiffs' claims are based on allegation that MTA, in its role as the Long Island
129 See Affidavit of Anthony M. Riccio Jr. dated August 5, 1998
Railroad, entered into certain agreements restricting the handling and transportation of solid waste in
Queens and on Long Island. Plaintiffs allege, upon information and belief, that these actions "are
part of a policy of the defendants... to site obnoxious environmental activity only in minority
neighborhoods and to exclude such activities from neighborhoods occupied by white residents of the
State."
The Holding of the Court: 130
Environmental organizations sued state and federal authorities and private companies to
enjoin, under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), Tide VI of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, and State Environmental Quality Review Act (SEQRA), state transportation authority's sale of
bus depot and plans for solid waste facility. Defendants moved to dismiss. This district court held
that: (1) there was insufficient federal control of bus depot transaction to reach threshold of NEPA
application; (2) Tide VI claim of intentional discrimination failed to state cause of action; (3) Title VI
disparate impact claim failed to make prima facie showing; and (4) ancillary jurisdiction over pendent
SEQRA claim was inappropriate. For those reasons, plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction
was denied and defendants' cross-motions to dismiss the complaint are granted. The Clerk of Court
was direct to close the case.
Outline for an Amicus Brief to Support the Plaintiffs' Claim
South Bronx represents a familiar scenario in environmental justice litigation. First,
environmental justice concerns are difficult to remedy through legal challenges, and second, there is
almost always an inherent imbalance in available resources between community groups and large
corporations or government agencies. In this case, the plaintiffs' claim is supported by two New
York lawyers arguing against the defendant's legal team of ten lawyers from high-profile firms in
New York City, the Attorney General Office of the State, and the U.S. Attorney's Office. An amicus
brief filed under such conditions may be particularly important in informing the court of the broader
public interests and audiences involved that support the claims of the plaintiff.
How might an amicus brief be written in this case to assist the court in rethinking a proper
remedy in favor of the plaintiff's claims of environmental injustice? Based on the holding of the
court in South Bronx, there appears to be several ways in which an amicus brief could broaden the
court's understanding of the plaintiffs' concerns beyond narrow legal grounds, and help to fill gaps in
the plaintiffs' claim. The loosest argument in the plaintiffs' allegations is the violation of Tide VI of
the Civil Rights Act. An amicus brief in this case could therefore provide information as to the root
130 Holding taken from 20 F.Supp.2d 565 (Sept. 8, 1998)
of the problems in the South Bronx, or any other city, which might in turn support these allegations
more completely for the court. The following is an outline of the ideas that could be expressed in an
amicus brief.
Grounds for Obtaining Leave to File an Amicus Curiae Brief:
In this case it is assumed that the plaintiffs would give an environmental justice group
written permission to file an amicus brief on their behalf. The motion for leave "shall identify the
interest of the applicant and shall state the reasons why a brief of an amicus curiae is desirable." 131 In
this scenario, the hypothetical environmental justice group could be the Bronx Neighborhood
Association ("BN A") concerned with urban air toxics, clean buses for the Bronx, and development and the
environment. This group, as part of the Greater New York Ci Environmental Justice Network, is dedicated to
solving public health and environmentalproblems in low-income communities and communities of color throughout New
York City. The New York Ciy Environmental Justice Network is a diverse group of organizations based in ty
neighborhoods and residents of affected neighborhoods in New York Ci that share technical information and resources
to support each other's struggles and coordinate joint activities to address regional and city-wide issues.132
As part of the New York Ci Environmental Justice Network, the BNA is committed to solving
environmental injustice by organizing for clean, safe and healthy communities throughout the city. The pncples of the
group are based on the idea that a livable community is a civil right, therefore this group desires to file a brief to ensure
the mutual respect that the South Bronx residents deserve. This group will be affected by the outcome in the case at bar
as the group's mission is to promote equiy andjustice in neighborhoods in the Bronx that have historical borne a
greater burden of wastes generated by New York Ci and Long Island residents.
The amici are interested infiling a brief to explain to the court how this project willfurther disadvantage the
group, should the court rule in the defendant's favor. Because the group interests also include organizingforpollution-
free MTA service in the ciy's low-income communities and communities of color, the court's holding in this case will
have a significant impact on the abiliy of the BNA tofurther its organization goals ofpromoting these efforts. As
amicus in this case, the BNA believes it can be of assistance to this court by providing additional briefing that
materialy adds to and complements the plaintiffs' brief 33
Content and Form of the Amicus Curiae Brief:
In an attempt to broaden the court's understanding of the perceived problem in terms of
environmental justice and equity, this amicus brief could focus on explaining the layers of this
problem and filling gaps in the plaintiffs claim. The plaintiff's claim is primarily centered on the
131 Federal Rules Appellate Procedure 29
132 Based in part on the mission of the Greater Boston Environmental Justice Network
133 Based in part on Cal. Prac. Guide Civ. App. & Writs Form 5:J.1
violation of procedural requirements under NEPA. Therefore, the court is provided with little
substantive information to support the allegations that low-income communities and communities of
color in the Bronx have been denied, as a result of the defendant's actions, benefits that more
affluent, white residents have enjoyed.
Drawing on the local expertise of the community, the brief could provide this information
by: (1) showing maps and "data" depicting land use patterns and related demographic information,
(2) explaining the negative impact of these land uses on the residents quality of life, as opposed to
relying on technical environmental assessments, (3) explain the shortcomings of environmental
regulations which set facility-by-facility standards, rather than protecting people from the cumulative
health impacts of residing near multiple facilities, and (4) explaining the principles and goals of
environmental justice initiatives and programs throughout the South Bronx to bring greater
accountability to these legitimate concerns. The brief could begin as follows:
In collaboration with the Greater New York EnvironmentalJustice Network, the BNA has spent the last
several years working on a community mapping project of the South Bronx neighborhoods which include communiy
narratives and historical information describing the development of the Bronx. The series includes maps showing racial
and ethnic composition in South and southeastern Bronx neghborhoods from 1950 to the present. A second map in
the series shows all of the industrial and hazardousfacilities and MTA facilities in the South Bronx, along with
housing projects, schools and churches. When these maps are overlayed, it is clear that these neighborhoods, with high
concentrations of low-income residents and people of color, have historically been designated as areas to site hazardous
facilities and polluting bus depots.
Due to the general concern that their neghborhoods are shouldering the wastes created in Long Island, the
group has attained a list of all transfer stations in Nassau and Suffolk Count and their general locations. As part of
the Freedom of Information Act, the BNA had compiled information regarding the volume of solid waste transferred
and volume of solid waste generatedfor transfer stations throughout New York Cit and Long Island. While this
information shows that Staten Island has historicaly been home to a large portion of the city's wastes, it is also clear
that the while Long Island has afew small transfer stations, the majority of the volume of waste generated in Long
Island and Queens is shipped to transfer stations in the Bronx. The information also shows that the small transfer
stations on Long Island are located in sections of Nassau and Suffolk counties that are removedfrom residential areas.
This information couldprovide the court with substantive evidence that may support the disparate impact requirements
crucial to supporting the plaintiffs' claim that the project is a violation of the Civil Rights Act.
The amicus brief could include additional asthma statistics for various parts of New York
City and information about asthma programs throughout various neighborhoods. This information
could be used to explain how these programs have tried to enhance the quality of life of inner-city
residents, and how a new facility will negate these efforts. The brief could educate the court as to
how residents are impacted by patterns of consistent industrial uses in their neighborhoods that
violate their rights to an equally safe, or "safely" polluted environment. The brief can inform the
court of the difficulties in proving the relationship between polluting facilities and health effects, but
they can submit information to show that where they work, learn, and live will be impacted by the
cumulative impact of additional polluting industry. An amicus brief could tell the court about the
different public health initiatives and campaigns currently in place in the community to help residents
identify and address issues that affect the health of the community. This could articulate the interests
of the amicus in relation to the plaintiffs' claims in this case. Finally, the brief could instruct the
court as to how community groups could benefit from participating in the environmental impact
assessment, review, and decision-making process. These efforts can be explained in the brief as part
of the larger goal to build environmental leadership to work toward social and economic justice for
their families.
An amicus brief written in this fashion would inform the court of the broader public
interests involved, and the broader implications of a particular ruling in terms of this organizations
principles. By explaining the programs and initiatives to create a livable community, this brief
explains how the ruling of the court will impact the resident's ability to realize a higher quality of life.
The brief therefore allows environmental justice groups to go beyond the narrowly focused legal
claim of the plaintiffs' allegations. This brief would provide the court with additional environmental,
demographic, and public health information pertaining to the subject locations and the greater Bronx
areas. This information could show why environmental justice concerns are not only legitimate, but
should be carefully considered in terms of the impact of governmental policies to exacerbate or
remedy these concerns. The map series and materials describing organizing projects and campaigns
may fill gaps in the plaintiffs' claim. Finally, by expressing the goals of this community group, this
brief may expand the court's understanding of the practical outcomes of the case at bar in terms of
environmental justice.
Conclusions:
"The strength of free peoples resides in the local community. Local institutions are to liberty what
primary schools are to science; they put it within the people's reach; they teach people to appreciate its
peaceful enjoyment and accustom them to make use of it. Without local institutions a nation may give
itself a free government, but it has not gotten the spirit of liberty."
-Alexis de Tocqueville, "Democracy in America"
This thesis describes a few aspects of the difficulties in litigating the principles of
environmental justice in order to purpose an alternative approach that allows groups to enter the
public policy forum of the court system while avoiding the confines of litigating. First, the thesis
points out the impediments to litigating perceived environmental injustice through environmental
laws and the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution. These impediments were examined by
illustrating the shortcomings in environmental laws and regulations to address the substantive issues
of environmental justice. An analysis of the discriminatory intent requirement of the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment was provided in order to show the relationship
between the difficulties in pursuing environmental justice claims in the court, and the claims brought
in exclusionary zoning cases. These difficulties were brought out in order to show that
environmental justice issues are not necessarily legal issues, but rather political and economic,
therefore the use of amicus briefs by environmental justice activists may be better suited for
educating the judiciary about environmental justice than a narrow legal claim. Defining
environmental justice for the courts through these briefs may help legitimize community concerns
for a clean and safe environment as a right, explaining how a particular outcome in a case could
either further, or reduce, these concerns.
The idea to participate as amicus curiae in pertinent litigation draws on the potency of local
expertise and the inadequacies of existing laws to bring justice. Four exclusionary zoning cases and
their respective amicus briefs illustrate the information these briefs contain. The amici provide
different language, perspectives, and positions from the views presented by the litigants, and offer
evidence of the benefits of this legal tool. These benefits of using these briefs in lieu of litigation
include:
I. The opportunity to express policy interests and perspectives to the court to show how
organizational policies will be impacted by a specific ruling;
II. Explaining to the court the broader implications of a ruling on groups other than the
parties in the litigation;
III. Filling gaps in the technical or legal arguments in the case to provide the court with
substantive information that may assist the court in developing a more educated ruling;
and
IV. The opportunity to express an alternative interpretation of the legal argument presented
by the parties, to assist in addressing unanswered questions of law.
This final chapter illustrates a few ideas that could be included in an amicus brief by a community
group to support and promote justice in decision-making processes that may adversely impact certain
neighborhoods. The South Bronx case is an example of the importance of these briefs in informing
the court of the various interests influenced by the court's holding. By proving additional
information to support the plaintiffs claim, this brief may help the court understand the larger
concerns of this community outside of the issues expressed in the legal challenge. Although every
case is unique, the basic ideas expressed in the amicus brief for the BNA support the idea that these
briefs, coupled with effective organizing campaigns, can expand the court's understanding of the
historical roots of problems expressed as environmental injustices.
Judges and community groups can benefit from the information provided in a written
account of successful organizing around land use issues. The filing of an amicus brief by one
community group not only strengthens the case for another group by supporting their efforts, but in
filing the brief the group creates a record of its involvement before the court and for future efforts
within that community. This can illustrate for the court the beliefs and realities that motivate
environmental justice advocates, and can provide added insight into unsettled aspects of land use law.
Because environmental justice has rarely been brought to the court as the sole reason for
litigating, the judges may not know the extent to which their decisions can shape the urban
environment. These gaps in understanding may be filled by thoughtfully written amicus briefs that
describe the practical applications of the principles of environmental justice. Due to the local nature
of land use decisions, and the local police power to establish zoning ordinances, grassroots
organizations can play a pivotal role in providing the court with their own local expertise.
Pursuing environmental justice through these briefs as part of community's organizing
strategy may result in more successful outcomes in litigation than cases in the past, and can alter the
way in which environmental justice is understood by the court and other policy makers in the future.
The use of amicus briefs by environmental justice advocates to communicate their concerns to the
public-policy making forum of the court is one way in which groups can participate in decisions that
impact their quality of life.
Environmental justice should be viewed as more than a response to alterations of some
people's physical landscape by environmental burdens. A call for justice requires us to consider the
environment as a social, cultural, economic, and physical setting that is jointly shared and protected
by all people. While the environment conjures up pastoral images for some, the reality is that most
aspects of the environment are controlled through policies and regulations, be they land use laws or
Clean Air and Water Acts.
It follows then that an environmentally just society is one in which people have the right to
participate, reform, and enforce, in some capacity, the regulations that shape the way they live. As
William Shutkin concludes in his article "The Concept of Environmental Justice and the
Reconception of Democracy":
The concept of environmental justice ultimately moves us closer to a conception of
ourselves as a democracy that we have always held but never lived up to. Environmental
justice tries to change, or rather perfect, prevailing conceptions of democracy so as to
change the norms of conduct that go along with them, and to change practical activity as a
whole. By striving to empower individuals and communities to participate in and take
control over decisions that affect their health and environment, environmental justice is an
effort to redeem the most aspirational aspects of the environment-democracy symbol-self-
realized individuals and self-regulating communities. Thus, environmental justice is both the
occasion for and the concept of our most progressive, dynamic approach to date to the ideal
of democratic governance (Shutkin p.588).
The basis for proposing the use of amicus briefs in environmental justice cases, and the
motivation for many of these communities to form and focus on gaining "political and legal
authority" over their neighborhoods, is self-determination. A constant theme in environmental
justice campaigns is that the independence to choose the fate of a neighborhood is taken away when
local decisions are made without input from community residents. The free will to determine what
communities will live with and without is often lost in the politics and economics of land use and
environmental decision-making. This interpretation of the urban environment, contained in a
written document to a court, may assist the judges in understanding why these concerns are labeled
injustices, rather than simply problems.
Appendix A
Principles of Environmental Justice
Adopted October 1991, Washington, D.C.
1. Environmenta/justice affirms the sacredness of Mother Earth, ecological unity and the
interdependence of all species, and the right to be free from ecological destruction.
2. Environmentaljustice demands that public policy be based on mutual respect and justice for all
peoples, free from any form of discrimination or bias.
3. Environmentaljustice mandates the right to ethical, balanced and responsible uses of land and
renewable resources in the interest of a sustainable planet for humans and other living things.
4. Environmenta/justice calls for universal protection from nuclear testing, extraction, production and
disposal of toxic/hazardous wastes and poisons and nuclear testing that threaten the
fundamental right to clean air, land, water, and food.
5. Environmentaljustice affirms the fundamental right to political, economic, cultural and
environmental self-determination of all peoples.
6. Environmenta/justice demands the cessation of the production of all toxins, hazardous wastes, and
radioactive material, and that all past and current producers be held strictly accountable to the
people for detoxification and the containment at the point of production.
7. Environmenta/justice demands the right to participate as equal partners at every level of decision-
making including needs assessment, planning, implementation, enforcement, and evaluation.
8. Environmenta/justice affirms the right of all workers to a safe and healthy work environment,
without being forced to choose between an unsafe livelihood and unemployment. It also affirms
the right of those who work at home to be free from environmental hazards.
9. Environmenta/justice protects the right of victims of environmental injustice to receive full
compensation and reparations for damages as well as quality health care.
10. Environmenta/justice considers governmental acts of environmental injustice a violation of
international law, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and the United Nations
Convention on Genocide.
11. Environmenta/justice must recognize a special legal and natural relationship of Native Peoples to
the U.S. government through treaties, agreements, compacts, and covenants affirming
sovereignty and self-determination.
12. Environmenta/justice affirms the need for urban and rural ecological policies to clean up and
rebuild our cities and rural area in balance with nature, honoring the cultural integrity of all
communities, and providing fair access for all to the full range of resources.
13. Environmenta/justice calls for the strict enforcement of principles of informed consent, and a
halt to the testing of experimental reproductive and medical procedures and vaccinations on
people of color.
14. Environmentaljustice opposed the destructive operations of multi-national corporations.
15. Environmenta/justice opposed military occupation, repression and exploitation of lands, peoples
and cultures, and other life forms.
16. Environmentaljustice calls for the education of present and future generations which emphasizes
social and environmental issues, based on our experience and an appreciation of our diverse
cultural perspectives.
17. Environmenta/justice requires that we, as individuals, make personal and consumer choices to
consume as little of Mother Earth's resources and to produce as little waste as possible; and
make the conscious decision to challenge and reprioritize our lifestyles to insure the health of the
natural world for present and future generations.
Appendix B
Environmental Equity/Racism/Justice Chronology"
0 1967- An African-American girl drowned at a poorly run solid waste landfill in an African-
American neighborhood, there were riots at Texas Southern University in Houston.
* 1968- The National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders reported that the systematic
neglect of garbage and sanitation services in inner-cities contributed to urban disturbances.
* 1979 - A non-scientific study of black life in Houston, Texas, reveals that all of the city-owned
municipal solid waste landfills and six of the eight garbage incinerators are located in black
neighborhoods.
* 1982 - State officials decide to locate a PCB landfill in predominantly black Warren County,
North Carolina. Residents rise up in protest. The civil rights arm of a major U.S. Protestant
denomination, the United Church of Christ's Commission on Racial Justice (CRJ), becomes
involved. Civil disobedience follows, and more than 500 people are arrested, including CRJ's
executive director, Rev. Benjamin F.Chavis, Jr. CRJ, which was founded in 1963 in the midst of
the civil rights movement, begins to turn its attention to environmental issues.
* 1983 - The General Accounting Office (GAO) launches an investigation of the socio-economic
and racial composition of communities surrounding the four major hazardous waste landfills in
the South. The GAO report reveals that three of the four landfills were located in
predominantly black communities.
* 1985 - The Center for Environment, Commerce and Energy is founded as the first national
African American environmental organization.
* The National Council of Churches' Eco-Justice Working Group begins focusing on
environmental equity issues.
* 1987 - CRJ releases its landmark study, Toxic Wastes and Race in the United States - A National
Report on the Racial and Socio-Economic Characteristics of Communities with Hazardous
Waste Sites. While presenting the report at the National Press Club in Washington, D.C., Rev.
Chavis uses the term "environmental racism" for the first time. Among the major findings:
Communities with the greatest number of commercial hazardous waste facilities had the
highest composition of racial and ethnic residents.
Although socio-economic status appeared to play an important role in the location of
commercial hazardous waste facilities, races still proved to be more significant.
Three out of every five black and Hispanic Americans live in communities with uncontrolled
toxic waste sites.
134 This chronology was developed from numerous sources. Much of the information came from the
consulting firm of Harris, DeVille & Associates, Inc. April 27, 1993. The decision to include events was my
own, but the language used may not be. It is in no way a detailed account of all important events.
* 1990 - The Conference on Race and the Incidence of Environmental Hazards is held in January
at the University of Michigan. This is the first time that an academic conference on race and the
environment is held where a majority of the presenters (9 of 12) are people of color.
* In September, the organizers of this conference meet with EPA Administrator William K. Reilly
and Council on Environmental Quality Chairman Michael R. Deland. The meeting is
supposedly the first for an EPA Administrator with a predominantly minority group to discuss
environmental equity issues.
* In response, Administrator Reilly organizes an EPA workgroup to study and report to him on
the issues raised at the Michigan conference.
* 1991 - The First National People of Color Environmental Leadership Summit is held in October
in Washington, D.C., attracting more than 600 participants and national media coverage. Rev.
Chavis and former New Mexico Governor Toney Anaya serve as co-chairmen of the four-day
summit. The major theme is that minorities are victims of "environmental racism," and among
other things, they make it clear they want to become part of the "lily-white" mainstream
environmental movement.
* 1992 - February 1992 is a watershed month for the environmental equity movement. EPA
releases a draft report entitled "Environmental Equity: Reducing Risk for All Communities."
The report, which was the work of EPA's Environmental Equity Workgroup that was organized
by Administrator Reilly in 1990, concludes there is a general lack of data on environmental health
effects by race and income. The report also details a list of eight recommendations to EPA, the
first of which was for the agency to increase the priority it gives to issues of environmental
equity. The release of the draft report attracts considerable national media coverage, and U.S.
Rep. Henry Waxman of California chairs a subcommittee hearing on the relationship between
race and environmental regulations. In general, environmentalists are critical of the report. The
final version of the report is released in June.
* At about the same time that was going on in Washington, the Louisiana Advisory Committee of
the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights conducts two days of fact-finding, environmental equity
hearings in Baton Rouge. The primary focus of the hearings centers around claims that minority
groups are being subjected to a disproportionate share of Louisiana's environmental problems.
* The March/April edition of the EPA Journal focuses exclusively on the environmental equity
issue.
* In May, the Federal Environmental Justice Act of 1992 is introduced in Congress. The purpose
of the act, sponsored by Sen. Al Gore and Rep. John Lewis of Georgia, is to assure that areas
with the highest concentrations of toxic chemicals are scrutinized to ensure equal protection
under the law and non-discriminatory compliance with all applicable environmental, health and
safety standards.
* In September, the Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality funds a year-long, $40,000
study on environmental equity. Two professors at the LSU Dept. of Political Science are the
principal investigators, and both have limited knowledge of industry.
* Also in September, EPA creates a headquarter-level Office of Equity.
* In December, the Birmingham, Alabama-based Southern Organizing Committee for Economic
and Social Justice holds the Southern Community/Labor Conference for Environmental Justice
in New Orleans. More than 2,500 civil rights, environmental and union activists attend, and
participants network, share common experiences and try to find ways to become more effective
in their fight against environmental racism.
* 1993 - EPA Region 6 forms an Environmental Equity Planning Committee in preparation for an
environmental equity conference in July. Industry is grossly underrepresented.
* On March 18, EPA conducts a public hearing on the proposed HON rule in Baton Rouge.
Among the claims made by those who testify: "Environmental racism is predominant in this
area. Plants are on top of poor and minority communities, poisoning them, devaluing their land,
etc."
* On March 27-28 in Birmingham, the Southern Organizing Committee for Social and Economic
Justice holds a follow-up strategy session to December's Environmental Justice Conference.
The stated purpose of the session is to outline strategies and develop an action plan.
* On March 29, the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights announces it is launching an investigation of
EPA's enforcement activities in minority communities. In a March 8 letter to EPA
Administrator Carol Browner, the commission's acting staff director says the probe is "a
preliminary examination of environmental equity issues and civil rights enforcement activities at
the EPA."
* During the first quarter of the year, inquiries from national media about equity issues become
more frequent for Lousiana Chemical Association member companies.
* On April 9, Rev. Chavis is selected as the new executive director of the National Association for
the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP). One of his goals is for the NAACP to become
active in environmental issues.
* In May, the Louisiana Advisory Council of the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights is scheduled to
release its written report on environmental equity issues in Louisiana.
* U.S. Rep. John Lewis of Georgia plans to reintroduce the Environmental Justice Act of 1992
once a new sponsor comes forward in the Senate.
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